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PSF: OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

1942

Donovan Report

No. 11

May 18 to 28

No. 511

May 18, 1942

12:00 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

The following is a digest of the British Political Warfare Report on German Home Propaganda for six days ending May 12.

1. Indicates Goebbels' reluctance to inform German people of Churchill's threat to use gas if it is employed by the Nazis against Russia. As distinct from German propaganda outside Reich, propaganda inside Germany gave extremely little attention to the subject, confining itself to denying that Germany has used poison gas. No statement can be found saying Germany will not use gas or British will retaliate if Germany starts. Nearest reference appeared in political review of May 12, wherein Churchill's remarks were called, "threats incompatible with international law".

2. Nazi Home Propaganda treated Eden's speech with utmost caution omitting references in Britain not wanting a restoration of prewar position. It is unlikely, says PWE, that ordinary German could know, from his own propaganda, that Eden has spoken at all.

3. At home Nazis exploited, "Japanese victory of Coral Sea" much less than abroad and much less than Japanese propaganda.

4. Goebbels is establishing the pun, "Weltkrieg and Roosevelt-Krieg" as part of German propaganda vocabulary. Also the slogan, "Ueberlegene Fuhrung" seems to be part of a standing German directive. The superiority of Nazi leadership instead of military, material or manpower superiority was stressed by Goebbels on April 19, and on May 3, in Das Reich and by Frick on May 9. The reference in Das Reich was broadcast week after publication.

5. German Home Propaganda tried to make capital out of United Nations silence over our own Coral Sea losses. Silence was severely criticized. An American broadcast, "this battle could yet end in a defeat and that it was too soon to rejoice" was cited by Germans in support.

6. Local German papers from many parts of Reich deal extensively with rumor-spreading. Main subjects of "latest" rumors seem to be: possible further ration reductions: air raid effects and corruption of local officials. In some local newspapers, editorials are appearing discussing German soldiers dislike for party officials at home and trying to explain why young men can be seen in mufti in Germany. One such editorial is called "Dodgers".

May 18, 1942

The Honorable Cordell Hull,
The Secretary of State.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

You will recall that I discussed with you the matter of obtaining intelligence from the Far East. I told you at the time of that discussion that we were working with a group of well qualified people in order to meet that deficiency. This group is part of a well organized business in the Far East. Before submitting the plan to the President, I would be very grateful if you would take the time to examine it and see if it would meet with your approval. You know that any criticism or suggestion of yours would be of value to us.

I am attaching an outline of the plan. In the event that you approve it in principle but would like to see how it would be made effective, I would be glad to have those of my colleagues who are working on it sit down with Mr. Hornbeck or anyone you might designate, in order to see how we could be of the greatest use to your Department.

Sincerely

William J. Donovan

NOV 19 1945

MEMORANDUM

Project to be undertaken by an established
American business organizationThe Task

To collect information relative to the intentions of the Japanese.

Field of Operation

Primarily China, both occupied and free.

The occupied areas in China provide a great and at present largely wasted leakage of information which the Japanese cannot plug because these areas contain thousands of their own civilians and military forces, frequently corrupt and inevitably in contact with the Chinese population; also because the Japanese must direct a great deal of propaganda based on some facts towards the subject populations in occupied areas in an effort to keep them subdued. Japanese militarists in China and Manchuria have long dominated their home government and often know much of its plans.

Besides China there are other points where information about Japan and the zones occupied by the Japanese military may be obtained. In London, efforts of private entrepreneurs to communicate with associates in occupied areas will be continuous and in some instances probably successful. In Zurich, a considerable channel of information and transactions may be tapped. In Calcutta, many refugees and travellers from Japanese war fronts may be found, many of whom will never reach nor report to the United States. In South America speedy exchange of telegrams with occupied China is still possible and large communities of Japanese still try to maintain contact with Japan.

Organization

The organization will be specially designated the Counter-Japanese Division of the Coordinator of Information.

1. In China the main headquarters would be at Chungking, with regional agents at Kunming, Kulong, Kweilin, Yen Ping, Kin Hwa, Chengchow and possibly at Sui Yuan.
2. In the United States agents will work in Washington, New York, and San Francisco.
3. In Europe agents will be stationed in London and Zurich.
4. In South America (subject entirely to the approval of the State Department) American businessmen could act to relay telegrams and establish contacts with Japanese communities. Their objective would be confined to information regarding the Far East.

Every employee wherever he may work, must have a first-hand acquaintance with Japanese-occupied China, Manchuria or Japan itself. To carry on this work properly it will be necessary to have priorities on all forms of communication and use of diplomatic pouch.

Not less than ten field organizers would be sent to Chungking by air at an early date.

Planning Group

To aid the active full-time staff, it is proposed to set up a Planning Group of resourceful, competent people now in the United States and lately in charge of large enterprises with widespread connections over China and in the occupied areas, such as Dr. Searle Bates, Vice-President of the University of Nanking; John Curtis, manager of the National City Bank in Japan and Manchuria; L. G. Cousins, Director of the British American Tobacco Company; Phil Lefevre, China manager for the Texas company.

As regards the local or regional agents:

New York - Must maintain closest check on travelers to and from Orient, Chinatown, Chinese institutions such as Bank of China, Universal Trading Company, head offices of American enterprises with personnel or interests in Japan or China, relatives of people known to be in occupied areas, mission headquarters, leading news agencies (for unpublished items).

San Francisco - Roughly the same as New York, and in addition contact with the C.O.I. radio propaganda office and all short-wave receiving stations, including amateur organizations in Shanghai.)

London - Maintains closest contact with Reuters, Jardine Matheson, Butterfield & Swire, Lloyds, as many insurance men as possible, British Intelligence agents, Chinese Embassy, Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, China Inland Mission - send all information via Embassy pouch.

Zurich - Closest contact with reinsurance companies, newspapers, correspondents, Reuters Swiss subsidiary, send telegrams to Shanghai to elicit replies which may yield information, send all information via diplomatic pouch.

Buenos Aires - or some other city in South America - Telegraphic center to and from occupied areas, with use of anti-militarist Japanese assistance. The purpose here is to obtain information, not about South America, but from combat and occupied areas.

Calcutta - The purpose is information from combat and occupied areas not information about India. Agent must be experienced in Japan and China - preferably also in Malaya, Indo-China.

China - Every American agent must be:

1. Thoroughly experienced in dealing with Chinese.
2. Have fair knowledge of the language.
3. Physically fit and know how to "live on the land" in the interior of China.
4. Entirely acceptable to Chinese authorities and to guerrillas.
5. Accustomed to handling substantial sums of money.
6. Willing to go into occupied areas himself where necessary.

Native agents to work in occupied areas must be organized, with special attention to Shanghai, to obtain a steady flow of information including daily newspapers, proclamations, notices, reports on economic conditions, reports reaching Shanghai from Japan, Foochow from Formosa, etc. This can be done under cover of tobacco dealers, oil dealers, insurance agents, etc., and also through already established Chinese underground channels.

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- 4 -

Members of the Chinese "Special Service" must be cultivated as well as former French Concession "politicos" now in Chungking. (They both still maintain their own organizations in Shanghai.)

To do this right, the greatest facilities will be needed from the State Department for the mail and cables of each agent.

May 18, 1942

arrive jusqu'à ces droits de souveraineté sur les

"2. Les navires de guerre ou de commerce qui sont
actuellement dans les ports des Antilles ne tomberont en aucun

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan
ment français et en accord avec lui.

Following is the text of a cable sent by Laval to
Henry-Haye: Monday, May 18:

"Après avoir constaté que le gouvernement américain
ne publiait pas le texte de la réponse que j'avais envoyée
à l'Amiral Robert et que j'avais remise à M. Pickney Tuck, après
avoir pris connaissance des demandes américaines, après avoir
pris connaissance des considérations que vous avez mentionnées
dans votre télégramme 1788-1789 comme étant celles qui animaient
le gouvernement américain, j'ai jugé à propos de communiquer
à la presse le texte in-extenso de la dite réponse.

"Cette publication s'imposait, dès l'instant où le
gouvernement américain qui avait pris l'initiative de la nego-
ciation ne la faisait pas lui-même; elle s'imposait également
afin que le public ne perde point de vue les origines du
problème diplomatique posé par l'action des Etats-Unis.

"J'ai ajouté à cette communication, les déclarations
suivantes:

1. La France n'abandonnera en aucun cas et quoi qu'il

arrive aucun de ces droits de souverainete sur les Antilles;

"2. Les navires de guerre ou de commerce qui sont actuellement dans les ports des Antilles ne tomberont en aucun cas entre les mains d'une puissance etrangere;

"3. L'Amiral Robert agit sous l'autorite du gouvernement francais et en accord avec lui.

"Aucune decision ne sera prise sans que le gouvernement francais ait donne son accord a l'Amiral Robert qui est son representant qualifie aux Antilles.

"J'aurais pu rappeler, en outre, que lorsque les accords Greenslade-Robert ont ete conclus, j'etais moi-meme a la tete du Conseil des Ministres. J'ai prefere ne pas le faire."

Admiral Robert telegraphed the French Naval Attache:

"Contrairement a ce qui a ete annonce par certains journaux les negociations economiques n'ont pas commence avec M. Reber.

"Toutefois, nous sommes tombes d'accord sur les garanties concernant les lignes de navigation Amerique, Antilles, Guyane, dans le cadre de l'accord commercial a conclure;

"D'accord egalement pour le combustible a fournir au DUC d'AUMALE, OREGON, SAGITTAIRE;

"D'accord egalement sur la mise du BARFLEUR a ma disposition et sur la mise en etat de navigation du BEARN."

Henry-Haye telegraphed to Mr. Ristelhueber, French Minister to Ottawa, as follows:

"Les negociations concernant le statut des Antilles se poursuivent dans une atmosphere detendue. L'immobilisation des navires de guerre a ete accordee par l'Amiral Robert. Les negociations d'ordre economique vont etre entamees. Je ne manquerai pas de vous tenir au courant."

Mr. Guerin, who is in charge at the North African bureau of the duties, or at least of a part of the duties, of the resigned Counselor Marchal, telegraphed his father, the Director of railroads for Morocco at Casablanca, as follows:

"J'apprends que trois navires espagnols vont partir a destination des Etats-Unis. Tachez d'obtenir la mise a la disposition du Maroc de 6000 tonnes pour chargements de charbon effectue a Mobile, par exemple. Si ce n'est pas possible, j'essaierai d'obtenir l'autorisation de charger sur un navire francais".

No. 512

May 18, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

Our representative at the weekly Joint Intelligence Committee meeting in London sends the following report as of May 15th.

"The enemy continues to strengthen his manpower in Libya at a rate of about 10,000 a month. A large part of these are airborne. They are maintaining the supply flowing from Italy. In the past week there have been four ships across to Tripoli, three to Benghazi, four from Tripoli to Benghazi. The week before that there were 30,000 tons across from Italy. Although the British representatives expressed themselves as not believing that a major Libyan attack is imminent, they think there may be some attempt on Tobruk, involving use of paratroops.

"Attacks on Malta should slacken. 6,000 tons of bombs

were dropped in April. During the past months the enemy has been forced to retain on the Eastern front additional forces believed to have been earmarked for Malta. Therefore the heavy attacks fell short of those required. During the past week Malta has been reinforced with 60 fighter planes and supply ships. There appears to be a shift in air activity to the Eastern Mediterranean. British destroyers, while hunting a convoy en route Aegean to Rhodes, were sunk off Crete by aircraft.

"The enemy is strengthening concentrations in Norway. They now have eight divisions there. These are thought to be defensive or in preparation for later joint action on Archangel and Murmansk. Supporting the latter hypothesis is the fact that the Admiral Scheer moved north last week, think to Narvik. The Hipper, Prinz Eugen and Tirpitz are still at Trondheim. The Eugen is damaged and not usable. The Hipper and Tirpitz exercised, while the Lutzow finished trials at Germany. Landing craft recently moved to North Norway and supply, repair ships have been sent to Narvik.

"The Russians continue to make progress in the river Lixa (possibly Luga or Neva) area. The Germans have considerable armament advantage in the South initial Russian manpower was probably greater. The German preparations for a major offensive had been continuing from Mariupol to Kursk sector. The Germans were not believed ready for their offensive until the end of May.

"British retreat in Burma to continue. Complete loss of heavy material forecast. Chinese operations in Burma are criticized by the English representatives on the grounds that they lacked organization and cohesion. The Chinese units fought separately and the employment of reserves was ill timed.

"The Japanese have moved most of their air squadrons from the Andaman Islands to Japan proper and have cancelled orders for certain fighters to move to the Andamans. Naval units have been moved from the Bay of Bengal, as the mandated islands harbor the bulk of the Japanese fleet.

No. 513

May 18, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

I think you will want to look at Otto Strasser's last analysis, which as you will see from the attached we have obtained from Canadian intercept.

You will note that his thesis is that the Russians have made us sacrifice the Japanese front, which is the most important one for the so-called United Nations. I am informed that Strasser's principal henchman, Fricke, states quite openly that the "Freie Deutsche Bewegung" is only a convenient cover for National Socialism. In other words, it is the Nazis without Hitler. You will note too, his comment on the shortcomings of democracy.

It may be that the Canadians are giving him a little too much freedom in his propaganda.

"ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY WAR
SITUATION" (beginning of April 1942) by
Dr. Otto Strasser

Strasser informs Fricke that the enclosed analysis is being sent only to the vice-presidents of the FDB and is not meant for publication.

As indicated in the analysis, the present attitude of the Democracies renders the foreign political work

of the FDB fruitless and forces them to make preparations to devote their energies to the cause in the post-war Germany rather than devoting them to the fight for the downfall of Hitler. The lack of a clear and unified post-war solution makes the democracies avoid any positive cooperation with a German partner. Strasser therefore requests Fricke to keep this analysis on his files for use as material for the book on their activity during the war; the book is later to be published in Germany.

Strasser explains to Fricke that it would be very difficult and expensive to take legal action against Singer. Moreover Singer has no money. Strasser adds: "If ever I write a book on the New York business methods, it will serve as an explanation of the growing Antisemitism in this hemisphere".

In reply to Fricke's query, Strasser informs him that they have, as yet, no representative for the U. S. A., except for the central part. Strasser hopes to be able to have Dr. Engelhardt as his representative in New York. Conditions are unfavorable in England, also, because 99% of the German Opposition there are Jews and Leftists. Strasser still hopes that Witt will be able to go to England or that Kuranda will be released. Then they would have excellent representatives. At present Herr Paul Plura /154 Scott Ellis Gardens, St. Johns Wood, London NW 8 acts as a temporary helper. Strasser says he knew Plura in Germany and Prague.

Analysis of the political and military War
Situation (Beginning of April 1942)

Foreword:

The following ideas are not written with the expectation that they will, in any way, influence the course of this war. The political influence of the writer is too insignificant for that - apart from the fact that the decisions for the next few months - and important months they are - have already been made internally and will develop more or less "according to schedule".

The purpose of these explanations is rather to give a sketch-like analysis of the present war and the situation of it. It is understood, of course, that the political views of the writer are very clearly expressed in it, so that the analysis reflects the ideas of a German and European who wishes to win the war against the totalitarian ideas - in order to prepare for economic, political and cultural cooperation amongst men and nations.

The Moral Weakness of the Democracies

The decisive weakness of the Democracies, from which all the political and military errors result, lies in the fact that the democracies (originally England and France, later England and America) have not realized the ideological-revolutionary character of this war.

There are some people on this side who consider this war only a "revised edition" of the Prussian-German

policy of world-domination; there are others who consider it exclusively as the personal work of a dictator who is greedy for power and lacking in scruples - but there is practically no one who has realized that it is only a logical further development of that mighty revolution which is taking place in Germany this time just as it took place in France in the 18/19th century and in England in the 17th century - and which, in each of these cases, affected the entire western culture economically, politically and socially.

The democracies did not realize that since the first decade of the 20th century the entire structure of Christian civilization - the economic order, the political order and the social order - were undergoing a deadly crisis, such as had developed as a result of the French Revolution. (The first world war is a part of it, just as Fascism, Nazism and World War No. 2 are).

Hitler is only the genial exploiter of this revolutionary change; he did not cause it, nor will he bring it to completion!

The failure to recognize this resulted in the moral weakness of the democracies, which permeates all of their political and military measures. Without recognizing the moral-revolutionary character of this change, they have not been, nor are they now, in a position to develop an ideological counter-force, a spiritual aim which is clear and stronger.

Even the unusually enlightening phenomena of the "Quislings" and of the so-called "Fifth Column" could not make the democracies realize the true state of affairs - nor the apathy of their own people, especially of the working classes, towards the war, an apathy which they observed and lamented.

The Political Weakness of the Democracies

An immediate result of this intellectual inability of the democracies to grasp the ideological-revolutionary character of this war, was and is their political inability to arrive at a clear political aim in this war.

It is absolutely shocking to hear and read the jumble of political opinions, views and aims which have been voiced and expressed in the camp of the democracies from the outbreak of the war until today - which increase rather than lessen the impression of the "tower of Babel".

This chaos of political aims has been considerably increased by the entrance of Russia and Japan into the war, and it is utterly impossible to speak of any sort of political uniformity amongst the "Allied Nations" as a whole or even amongst the Democracies in the Allied Nations - or even within a single part of a single country.

It is clear that a real and perhaps fatal weakness must result therefrom for the political position as a whole - but above all : the impossibility of a "political warfare"!

This political warfare, used originally by the Communists and later by the Fascists and Nazis with such extraordinary success, is one of the strongest proofs of the revolutionary-ideological character of this war; it is to this that the Bolshevists before and the Nazis now owe their successes.

Hitler himself used this method to such a high degree that we can say: his armies never marched until the opponent had been undermined by political warfare and made ready for capitulation.

The grotesque lack of understanding shown by the Democracies towards the Opposition forces in Germany, Italy, etc., is a very tragic subject - especially if one compares with it the grandiose employment of this political warfare on the part of the Axis powers, in Europe as well as in North Africa, in South America as well as in Eastern Asia.

The Military Weakness of the Democracies

From the moral and political weakness of the democracies there resulted quite logically their military weakness which has become apparent in the years since 1933, and especially since 1939.

Apart from the fact that the excuse of insufficient armament in the years from 1933 to 1938 is the best proof of the lack of moral and political understanding with which the Democracies judge the phenomenon, Hitler,

and historical investigation at some later date will show that the material superiority from the beginning until the end of the war was always on the side of the Allies.

The lack of a clear strategy, of a uniform effort and of the use of all political and military possibilities is alone responsible for the series of defeats which the Allies have suffered in the course of the war so far.

The words of Clausewitz are still pertinent: "The war is the continuation of the policy - with other means" - and logically enough a poor warfare must result from a faulty political aim (a poor policy)!

It is impossible for the people of this generation to recognize anything in the way of a "strategic idea" in the military measures taken by the Allies - until, later, Moscow rendered such a strategy obligatory, a strategy which threatens to become fatal for the war and for the peace (as I shall endeavour to explain in the following remarks).

Russia's Role

The role of Russia in this war is demonstrated by the fact that Hitler was able to start the war on September 1, 1939, only because he was protected by this pact of August 23, 1939, with Moscow.

Moscow signed this pact not only with the knowledge but also with the purpose of the outbreak of war - hoping in a general way that this war would cause England

and Germany (and later America and Japan) to destroy each other, so that Russia as the sole surviving world power would emerge from this war as the moral victor.

Even in the document with which the state commissary Molotov censured Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, Molotov pointed out that Moscow had carefully fulfilled all the duties of alliance in regard to Berlin and had been ready and willing to continue to do so.

Russia's entrance into the war on the side of the Democracies was not, therefore, a voluntary decision on the part of Moscow but rather an obligatory military measure rendered necessary by Hitler's attack on Russia.

It is in line with the successes of the Communist propaganda mentioned at the beginning that this fact was completely forgotten in the course of six months, and that the Democracies boast of a Russian "alliance", which they owe to Hitler alone.

Only in the light of this basic fact does Russia's attitude in the Pacific war become comprehensible!

The anomaly that Russia still maintains its "friendship pact" after Japan's attack upon its "allies" America and England, and even gives it great economic significance by the extension of the fishing treaty on March 20, 1942, is exceeded only by the confused helplessness with which the Democracies face this pact.

England and America do not make the further shipment of war-materials to Russia (which they do by foregoing

their own needs and using their own war and merchant ships) depend upon the use of Siberian harbors or aeroplane bases - nor do they dare to answer Russia's demand for the opening of a second front in Europe by the natural counter-demand for a "second front against Japan".

Without further comment on this subject which characterized the mental attitude of the Democracies towards Russia, the fact is clear that the so-called allied nations are today carrying on two separate wars, while the axis powers are carrying on a single unified war!

The present strategy of the Allies

In view of this fact it is all the more difficult to understand how the Russians have succeeded in getting the Democracies to accept a strategy which not only serves the interests of Russia, but is also, at the same time, contrary to the interests of the Democracies.

Nothing indicated more clearly the lack of a moral and political aim on the part of the Democracies - both of which are to be found in the case of the Russians - than does this fact.

A survey of the tremendous strategic and economic importance of Singapore and Burma, of the Malayan peninsula, of the Philippines and of the Dutch colonial empire for the situation of the Democracies in the war and in the peace, makes it clear that it was of foremost importance for the Democracies to hold these positions.

Hence, with Japan's entrance into the war there was urged upon the Democracies the necessity of changing their strategy in such a way that the main weight of the American, and a considerable part of the British, Dutch, etc. force could be concentrated upon the Pacific theatre of war while it seemed advisable to launch a defensive (based upon the fleet and the RAF) against Hitler - combined with a political offensive throughout Europe, especially in Germany and Italy.

But the picture looked quite different when viewed from Moscow! Apart from the question of the extent to which the Russian interests were even positively concerned with driving the Anglo-Saxon powers out of the great markets of China, Indo-China and India, there resulted automatically from the Russian one-front war the consideration that the Democracies for their part should devote all their energy against the enemy there, namely against Hitler.

The inevitable losses which resulted strategically and economically for the democracies in the Pacific were of little importance from Moscow's viewpoint - whereas if another strategy had been used Moscow would have had to fear that the Democracies might under certain circumstances adopt the same indifferent attitude towards Hitler which Russia showed, and still shows, towards Japan.

It is as easy to understand the Russian attitude as it is difficult to understand the attitude of the Democracies!

That can be said today with convincing proof after the Russian winter offensive. For the hope that the neglect of the Pacific theatre of war in favor of assistance to the Russians would place them in a position to lead the German Army to a fatal defeat, has proven illusory. From the viewpoint of territory, the Russian winter-offensive has restored a bare 10% of the territory which the German Army conquered in 5 months of the summer and autumn of 1941. More decisive, however, is the fact that they did not break through the German front at a single place and that all the important key-positions are still in the hands of Hitler.

In the general judgment of this war this strategy is therefore to be evaluated according to whether Singapore is considered more important than Kalinin - or Rangoon more important than Moshisk!

Nevertheless, the Russians and their influential groups of friends in the Democratic countries have succeeded in having the Democracies adopt this strategy for the spring and summer months of 1942.

Even the distressing defeats which England has suffered in India as a direct result of this strategy could not bring about any change in it.

According to the present state of affairs it may be assumed that the so-called "United Nations" will pursue this "Russian strategy" for the future war operations: namely the concentration of the far greater part

of their forces against Hitler, the placing of Russian interests before their national interests and the neglect of the war against Japan.

Even if this strategy were successful, Russia would be the only country which would benefit thereby. For in such a case, Russian troops would occupy all the strategic positions in Europe while the troops of the Democracies would then have to resume very quickly the war against Japan which has been postponed to suit the Russians.

Moreover, it would mean that not only the masses of Europe and especially the masses of the German people would have to adopt their ways to suit Moscow but also that any post-war government in Germany would have to fall in line first and foremost with the Russian policy which would mean that the actions of the Democracies would become dependent upon the conditions of the European post-war order, especially since the Democracies would have to rely chiefly upon Russian help in their war against Japan which would only really begin then.

All experts in these matters are clear on the fact that from a purely naval view-point the recovery of the areas which have been lost and the conquest of Japan are impossible.

Such a mighty land attack could however go only via India, Burma and Japan - or via Siberia. In the

first case the cooperation of large European troop contingents (especially German troops!) seems indispensable, while the second method requires the cooperation of Russia - for which Russia would probably exact a suitable price from the Democracies - apart from the fact that the Democracies for their part gave their help to Russia without asking for any recompense.

The present strategy is therefore, not merely dictated by Russia, but corresponds with the interests of Russia and Bolshevism, for today and tomorrow, for war and peace.

New Strategy for War and Peace

In order to make the criticisms offered in this analysis constructive, it is necessary to develop a different and better strategy for the winning of the war and of the peace.

After the basic recognition of the moral-revolutionary character of this war, it is necessary above all for the democracies to consider and treat this as a "war of ideas".

Over against the idea of domination which is represented by the Axis powers (not only in the field of internal and external policies) the Democracies must clearly place the idea of cooperation as their battle-cry and aim.

This would result naturally in the cooperation with those millions amongst the peoples of the Axis powers

who stand for the idea of cooperation and who have fought and suffered for this idea - for many years before the democracies even understood it.

Moreover, it would result in the formulation of a clear and positive post-war program not only to give their own people a goal worth fighting for but also, and above all, to give the masses of the German and Italian people another alternative, which they lack today.

Hand in hand with this political aim must, of course, go the prevention of Hitler's (and Japan's) military successes!

The strategy for this is based upon the fact that Hitler - as the aggressor - will have won the war only when he can dictate the peace terms himself in London and Washington.

On the other hand, the Democracies - as the defenders, will have won the war when they can hold their vital positions and continue the war from them.

The vital position of the Democracies is, however, England, the supply-lines between England and the American continent!

If Hitler cannot conquer England and cut off the Atlantic lifeline, he has lost the war - even if his troops are in Cairo, Mossul and Moscow.

In this case it may be assumed, and even calculated, with mathematical accuracy, that the Hitler regime

will be overthrown by an internal revolution in Germany - especially since it is never possible for him to make a real peace with the oppressed European nations (including the majority of the German people themselves).

This process will be considerably accelerated by political warfare on the "theatre of war of Germany's homefront", by as intensive a bombardment as possible, of the German Hinterland and by a rigid blockade.

This strategy of a military defensive combined with a political offensive against Europe - and as active warfare as possible in the Atlantic and the Pacific (supported by the fleet and the airforce) - would open the safest way not only for winning the war but also, above all, for winning the peace. For in the case of this solution it will be the spirit of the Democracies which will have the decisive influence upon the future order of Europe - and Europe itself will help the Democracies to regain and hold the positions of the white race in the far East.

Dr. Otto Strasser

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 20, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR W.J.D.

No. 514 - May 19, 1942

In regard to messages to the
Greeks and the Yugoslavs, I wish you
would talk to the Secretary of State
about this phase. I approve the
principle of some kind of a message
from me.

F.D.R.

No. 514

May 19, 1942

12:00 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

On last Wednesday, May 13, my memorandum No. 495, I sent you a plan that we were working out in the matter of delivering food to those who were resisting in Greece and to the Yugoslavs. I suggested at that time that as soon as we were ready to move, I would ask you if you would be willing to send a message to General Mikhalovitch and his men, and to the Greeks. As we are primarily concerned with fostering resistance to the Axis, these messages are directed to the fighting men in Yugoslavia and to such people in Greece as would resist if they had the strength and the organization. The purpose of the messages is two-fold.

- (a) To praise them for what they have done.
- (b) To give them encouragement to keep on resisting.

You will know better than we what kind of messages you would wish to send. Therefore please consider the following only as suggestions.

The message to the Yugoslavs might be along the following lines:

"To General Mikhalovitch and his brave men:

"I salute the fierce and courageous resistance of the men of Yugoslavia in the face of terrible odds. It is worthy of your past tradition and an inspiration to all men who fight for freedom. Stand fast. Your Allies will neither forget nor desert you."

The message to the Greeks might contain this thought:

"To the people of Greece:

"Your glorious resistance and your present sufferings are not forgotten by your Allies. Have courage for our growing strength will bring you liberation."

These messages will be printed on the label which will be pasted on each can of concentrated food or vitamins. On this label will also be a message from the King of Yugoslavia and the King of Greece respectively and directions for the use of the food. Across the top of the label will be printed, "THIS IS A GIFT FROM THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES".

In regard to the shipments, the following arrangements have been made:

- (1) Delivery of the food will be made within four days of the time the labels are in the manufacturers' hands.
- (2) The Ferry Command has agreed to transport the first ten tons by air.
- (3) The Yugoslavia and the Greek legations are

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doing the translation and our New York office is setting up and printing the labels.

As soon as you can give us an indication of the messages you would care to send, all the machinery will start to work.

No. 515
May 19, 1942
6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

The following report has just come to us from our London office:

- "1. There is in progress an intensified Germanization campaign in Alsace preparatory to annexation.
- "2. Use of French language is banned, and its users are arrested.
- "3. All holidays for civil servants have been abolished and they are on fifty-six hour, 7-day week.
- "4. Officials under sixty years of age are required to do three weeks farm service.
- "5. All persons regardless of age are being deported to Germany if they are without approved occupation.
- "6. Despite the severest oppression, opposition is continuing."

No. 516

May 19, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

For your information, the following is taken from a report made on January 31, 1942 by the Argentine Ambassador at Vichy, to his government.

"The German authorities at the last moment and after previous authorization, refused permission for my journey to Paris. The Minister Palacios Costa told me by telephone that Berlin based its refusal on certain alleged declarations against Germany. An unacceptable lie is thus added to lack of consideration towards the Argentine Government. I made no declaration whatever, either public or private. It is childish to suppose that I should have, in the present circumstances. I am afraid this may delay my journey owing to the German authorities preventing my getting my luggage out of Paris. I am told that they are already putting difficulties in the way of Argentines wishing to leave the Occupied Zone for our country."

He continues: "I still insist on the inexplicable attitude of the German authorities, whose motive I am unable

to fathom," and states that in view of the delicate position in Vichy, he has always maintained an attitude of the utmost circumspection, "having never, either in official or private conversations departed from the policy outlined by the Government regarding foreign relations."

He is particularly annoyed by the German allegation - communicated by Palacios Costa - that "circumstances had altered since the Argentine Government made the request." Reiterating his declaration that he had made no statements to the Press, as he is always being asked to do, he continues:

"I think that the German Government's attitude is the result of a deliberate policy regarding the Argentines who are in France. Information to that effect is reaching me through various channels, indicating that the departure of the few still remaining in the Occupied Zone - after many of them having been detained, on political grounds - is being made so difficult that some of them, in face of the German authorities' refusal to extend their permits, are preparing to cross the demarcation line by their own clandestine ways.

"I am sure you will take this information into account with regard to the German subjects and diplomats living in Argentine, judging that, in present circumstances, respect for

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the elementary rules of diplomatic courtesy depends on the possibility of reprisals that each country may exercise to enforce respect for their representatives and make those traditional rights prevail which seemed to have already been definitely accepted by civilized nations."

No. S-39

May 19, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From William J. Donovan

The following message was sent by Laval to Henri-Haye on Monday, May 18.

"Je vous ai transmis pour votre information personnelle, par télégrammes 1108-1115, le texte complet de la réponse aux demandes américaines, que j'ai remise à M. Pickney Tuck et que j'ai envoyée à l'Amiral Robert pour qu'il la communique à M. Reber et à l'Amiral Hoover.

"Mais en raison de commentaires de la presse américaine et anglaise d'une part, des propos de la radio anglo-américaine d'autre part, je crois utile pour éviter tout malentendu de vous prier de remettre immédiatement au Département d'Etat, le texte susvisé tel que vous l'avez reçu dans mes télégrammes 1108-1115 susdits.

"Vous prendrez occasion de cette visite au Département d'Etat pour protester nettement contre la campagne de la presse et de la radio américaines laquelle représente de la façon la plus inexacte la façon dont la négociation sur les Antilles s'est engagée et se poursuit.

"Vous voudrez bien me tenir très strictement informé des réactions de la presse et de la radio américaines, à cet égard."

I am informed the Ambassador has stated that he will refuse to make the suggested protest.

No. 517

May 19, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

We have been advised through a reliable source that at the conference with Japanese military attaches in Berlin held the second week in May, information available to those present indicated the following:

1. Military operations of Japanese are still uncoordinated and unconnected with European military operations.

2. Japan will begin war against USSR in spring or summer of this year.

3. Japan maintains no obligations to Axis on questions relating to Russia.

4. Japan takes particular note of statement of Hitler to Oshima at beginning of Russo-German conflict, to the effect that Germany would liquidate Russia and that Germany was uninterested in participation of Japan in struggle against USSR.

No. 518

May 19, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

We have just been informed through sources considered reliable that German agents in neutral countries have recently received instructions to develop propaganda on following lines:

1. Should Germany fail to defeat the USSR in 1942 the possibility of seizure of power by German communists must be taken into consideration.
2. A German communist government would make a separate peace with Russia and a Russo-German communist alliance would be formed.
3. No neutral nation could defend itself against such an alliance.
4. Therefore, all neutral countries, especially those which are adjacent or near to USSR, must do everything in their power to ensure victory for Germany over the USSR this year.
5. Germany is prepared at any time to effect a compromise with Great Britain with the object of destroying communism.
6. German agents are also to spread propaganda about Nazi-Soviet peace feelers and the possibility of Nazi regime and USSR concluding a peace treaty.

No. 519

May 20, 1942

12:00 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

Through an Italian geographer, now in this country as a refugee, we have obtained a set of maps of Italy, showing the locations of the most important dams and electrical supply stations which feed the whole of the northern, central and southern part of Italy's industrial and railroad systems.

The author of these maps states that the destruction of these dams would meet not only with the approval of a great majority of Italians but also with that of the small minority which has invested money in these works. He states that the total or even partial destruction of the electrical supply stations would be a critical blow to Italy and would stop the operation of factories engaged in making war material; that the disruption of the communications system would have a tremendous reaction upon the morale of the civilian population.

We have furnished copies of these maps to the Army, the Navy, and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

No. 520

May 20, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

The following is taken from the British Political Warfare Guidance issued on May 19 to regional heads and the British Broadcasting Corporation.

"Owing to the distance of Russia, the lack of facilities for obtaining and sending information and the probability that in the coming struggle on the eastern front, both sides will exaggerate successes and minimize defeats in order to influence the morale of their respective troops and civilian populations as well as foreign opinion, Political Warfare Executive will find it difficult promptly to supply Intelligence and Guidance after the struggle begins. In these circumstances it will be imperative at times to adopt a policy of 'wait and see' if we are to safeguard our reputation for accuracy. It is essential that this shall be secured at all costs, since if our reputation is sacrificed by anticipations or conjectures which prove to be false, we shall lose our audiences both in the enemy countries and in Europe with the result that our efforts will be rendered futile."

No. 521
May 21, 1942
12 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

The following is a digest of the British Ministry of Information secret weekly strategy directive:

"Russia:

"1. Murmansk. The Russian force which landed on April 28 on the southern shore of Motovski Gulf was forced to withdraw. New landing has been reported.

"2. Kharkov: The battle continues with the German counter-drive towards Isyum continuing to threaten to envelope the Russians within the Barvenkova salient. German reports of large scale Russian attacks elsewhere have had no confirmation.

"3. Kerch is an important gain for the Germans since, firstly, it furnishes a springboard for an advance across the strait, secondly the Russian threat to flank the Germans in the Ukraine is removed, thirdly,

the present possibility of Russian relief of Sevastopol is eliminated and, fourthly the Germans are provided with advance airfields from which they can attack Novorossisk Tuapsi and Western Caucas communications.

"Guidance:

It is unwise to draw conclusions on the Donetz battle. The Russians have advanced 40 miles along a front of 100 miles and have inflicted heavy casualties. The balance of manpower is in favor of the Russians. The Luftwaffe is still inadequate on all fronts. Full exploitation of our air superiority is paving the way for an attack in the West.

"Far East:

Straight news is advised, with emphasis growing air strength and its increasing activity against Japanese shipping.

"Policy

In order to deepen depression after failure and to diminish confidence in German victory, our attack on German nerves should: (a) Compare early German victories, if any, with the campaigns of last summer and the misleading Nazi reports then. (b) Emphasize unsolved

domestic problems, shortages in food and manpower, dangers within, and (c) plug the growing RAF offensive and the coming carefully prepared invasion of Europe which was mentioned in Parliament by Cripps. Instill sense of inevitability of Germany's defeat. Strike the note of complete confidence as the world now sees Germany beset on all sides with growing dangers they cannot escape. Convince the Germans that we are carefully planning victory, that every step is part of a plan and that the initiative will soon pass to us."

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No. 521

May 20, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

The following is taken from the British Political Warfare secret weekly strategy directive.

"1. Russian front:

a. Minor Soviet attacks without positional changes on Murmansk front along Volkhov River southeast of Leningrad and Lake Ilmen sector;

b. German resistance stiffening on Kharkov front after Russian attack had made progress and developed into a major operation extending from few miles north of Volohansk to near Krasnograd. The most promising Russian advances are southeast of Kharkov;

c. Probably Russians still holding part of town of Kerch even after Germans original attack with two or three divisions was reinforced by two or three more. German attack continues to make progress.

"2. Malta: Reduced attacks with defense continuing vigorously.

"3. Libya: Slight eastward movement by four enemy groups including tanks and motorized transport toward

Sidi Breghisic and El Chebir with increasing patrol activities both sides.

"4. Southwest Pacific: Concentration of Japanese transports on May 7 sufficient to carry one division supported by warships attacked by allied forces near Louisiade Archipelago, one aircraft carrier, one cruiser sunk, one aircraft carrier damaged, twenty-three Jap aircraft reported destroyed.

"5. Burma: No certain information but reason to believe British troops successfully withdrawing from western Burma toward Indian Frontier. Chinese sources report Japanese occupied Bhamo May 5, Myitkyina Railway terminus north of Fangoon May 8. Jap advanced up Burma Road far as Lunging in Yunnan Province with fighting reported May 11."

No. 522

May 20, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

We have received the following report today from our man in Anakra:

"According to responsible Greek refugees arriving here Axis-dominated police Athens demand return of deceased bread card before issuing burial permits so it is a common sight in the streets of Athens to see dead left on sidewalks during the night with pillows under their heads and their hands crossed piously on their breasts. All identification removed because desperate families need additional bread card.

"Reliable figures show best fed Athenian workers get 940 calories daily. Schools closed March because children mostly too weak to continue. Great increase miscarriages and premature births because of malnutrition. Prices on black market: flour 4500 drachmas per oka, eggs 250 apiece, potatoes 1800 per oka, olive oil 6000 pint, macaroni 6000, gasoline 3000, men's suit hundred thousand, shoes eighty thousand. Only articles available open market, matches and bread.

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"Athens blackout begins 8:00 P.M. Pireus quarantined
end April spotted typhus. Hospitals avoiding operations
because malnutrition prevents wounds healing."

May 21, 1942

MÉMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

Henri-Haye sent the following telegram to Vichy on May 21.

"Jusqu'à ces dernier jours, le mot d'ordre donné à tous les journaux et à tous les commentateurs de radio était de préparer l'opinion à une longue guerre. L'année 1942 devait être une année de mise en place des moyens de combat. L'année 1943 devait être une année de dures batailles. L'année 1944 devait marquer la victoire.

"Or voici que depuis trois jours, la presse et la radio, ainsi que les personnages officiels ont complètement changé de ton: la fin de la guerre sera cette année; tout l'effort doit être donné immédiatement et cet effort doit être donné si vite et si fort qu'il est inutile de construire de nouvelles usines, les usines actuelles devant travailler à plein rendement.

"On retrouve ce son de cloche dans les paroles mêmes des personnages les plus officiels. C'est ainsi qu'à sa conférence de presse M. Cordell Hull a dit aux journalistes qu'il avait le meilleur espoir de voir la guerre se terminer promptement. Quelques instants avant, il avait dit à Miss Ann Morgan, qui me l'a répété, que la guerre serait terminée d'une façon ou d'une autre au mois d'octobre et qu'à ce moment il serait possible de mettre

des navires à la disposition d'organismes de ravitaillement, chose impossible aujourd'hui.

"Le motif de ce changement d'attitude si profond et si soudain, sont de plusieurs sortes:

"1. Il est probable que l'Administration américaine veut soutenir le moral chinois très durement éprouvé comme l'atteste un appel au secours très angoissé lancé hier par le porte-parole du gouvernement de Chungking. On laisserait ainsi entendre aux Chinois, qu'en tout cas, les opérations en Europe étant terminées vers l'automne on pourrait alors venir à leur secours.

"2. Le désir de soutenir la position politique de M. Churchill très attaqué en ce moment même à la Chambre des Communes, dans un débat sur la conduite de la guerre;

"3. Le désir de maintenir les cours de la Bourse, lesquels ne cessent de baisser et sont, en ce moment, aux niveaux de 1934;

"4. Le souci de maintenir le moral de la nation américaine au moment où l'administration publie un programme fiscal qui va atteindre très durement tous les contribuables du haut en bas de l'échelle sociale;

"5. Une action de propagande sur le moral russe, maissant entendre que les Etats-Unis sont si convaincus que les russes vont repousser les allemands qu'il ne fait point de doute pour les dirigeants américains que la fin des opérations en Europe est pour le mois d'octobre.

"Quels que soient en réalité, les motifs qui animent ceux qui se livrent aux déclarations optimistes de ces jours derniers, on ne peut que souligner - malgré la puissance des moyens de propagande dont on dispose ici - qu'il y a si loin de la vérité des faits militaires au lyrisme des prédictions, qu'il a fallu des raisons bien impérieuses pour provoquer un tel langage."

Monsieur de Saint-Quentin, French Ambassador to Rio de Janeiro, sent the following telegram to Henri-Haye on May 20.

"Ci-après copie de mon télégramme à Vichy: J'ai demandé au gouvernement brésilien s'il était exact que les républiques sud-américaines avaient été informées d l'ouverture et de la marche des négociations de la Martinique par le gouvernement américain, et s'il approuvait la démarche américaine. Le Sous-Secrétaire d'Etat m'a répondu que son gouvernement avait tout ignoré à l'origine et n'était pas plus renseigné sur les développements survenus depuis. Il a ajouté que l'Ambassadeur à Washington avait fait des réserves à ce sujet au Département d'Etat."

No. 523

May 22, 1942

12 noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

1) We have been informed that a declaration of war on the Axis by Mexico is expected.

2) In commenting upon the prospective visit to this country of the Venezuelan Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Spanish Ambassador has stated:

"This is a move towards the United States practically taking over Venezuela."

No. 524

May 22, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

The following report comes from our representative at the Joint Intelligence Committee in London.

The Joint Intelligence Committee meeting of May 20 reported the following of significance. A Libyan attack by the enemy is expected in the very near future by British representatives. Enemy aircraft has been moved up to operational bases. Tanks used with patrols to check British patrol activity. Enemy assault craft is assembled in Cyrenaica. Supplies in good quantity continue to move to Tripoli and Benghazi with the air neutralized by Malta attacks. British representatives think Tobruk will be the chief objective, but do not rule out the possibility of a more general objective.

Activity within Italy has been reported. New eighth army has been formed, not for the Russian front but for other operations. To stem deterioration of morale, the Italians are thought to need an easy victory. Nice, Corsica or Tunis are mentioned as hypothetical objectives. with Tunis exceedingly doubtful.

In North Norway enemy naval units continue to assemble.

Lutzow has moved from Kiel and is now north of Trondheim. In North Norway the long range bomber strength has been increased. The Russians make no attempt to bomb airports.

Kerch is in the hands of the enemy. Wholesale capture of Russians is denied. The Russian advance of 40 miles south-east of Kharkov is now endangered by the German drive further south toward the Russian rear. The Germans are thought to have ten tank divisions in the Ukraine. They have been forced to employ four tank divisions in the present action. The Germans have also withdrawn 300 aircraft from the Crimea. In the far north the Russians have been forced to withdraw from the river Lixa with heavy losses.

Replying to a direct question by an American Army representative, a poll of British representatives present revealed the belief that the chances are four to one against Japan's attacking Russia this summer. The Russians are believed to be slightly stronger in manpower with about equal armored and air strength. General McClure, United States Military Attache was informed by the Russian Air Attache in London that the Russians did not move or exchange troops from the Far East this winter as widely reported.

Joint Intelligence Committee subcommittee paper this week on Japanese merchant shipping concludes that a shortage of shipping facilities will not hamper the Japanese military operations during the summer of 1942. Working data has been obtained.

No. 525

May 22, 1942

6:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

The following is the British Political Warfare
German directive (proposed) for the week of May 31 to June 6:

1. Plug Goering's speech of May 20. Significant

points are:

- a. Admission war must be long and last three
harvests bad.
- b. Over dramatic version of Eastern campaign.
Propaganda aim of speech to justify speedup, special
powers at home by enlarging suffering of soldiers.
- c. No attacks on Britain. Jew only enemy.
Significant connection with attempted negotiated peace.
- d. Goering accepted story Hitler personally
decided not retreat in Russia.

2. P.W.E. suggested comment:

- a. Expose trick painting Russian winter black
to justify events at home.
- b. Bad harvests make intense suffering inevitable

-2-

in long war.

c. Goering trying comeback by highlighting
Fuehrer's genius in Russia.

No. 526

May 22, 1942

6:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

This report, covering highlights of the week's war on the propaganda front, is based on recording of shortwave broadcasts at FCC's listening posts in Washington and Portland, Oregon; the Columbia Broadcasting System's listening posts in San Francisco and New York; on medium wave broadcasts recorded by the British Broadcasting Corporation, and by our own monitors.

What the Enemy Did

The Axis radio was a poor second to the American radio in this week's psychological warfare.

Europeans particularly must have been increasingly impressed with the news from the United States. That this is the opinion of Axis propagandists is clear from the continuing and concerted Axis propaganda line to the effect that our reports are simply propaganda and not to be believed. This tactic has been used for the past month on every major story. The latest occasion for the Axis to use it is the struggle in southern Russia.

The intensification of the line coincided with (1) the brighter picture for the Allies on the war and production fronts; and (2) our switch from straight news reports to equally accurate accounts of the situation but angled to get the maximum psychological and practical results.

It becomes increasingly clear each week that we have at last overcome the enormous head start that the Axis propagandists had, that we are now giving as a routine matter as much and, in most cases, more than we are taking.

The big story of the week that completely overshadowed all the others was the story of the fighting at Kharkov and Kerch.

At the beginning of the week the Axis ignored the fighting at Kharkov and concentrated on the German offensive against Kerch. It was said that the fall of Kerch was merely a matter of time, that the Russian armies there "were being annihilated." Reports of the "annihilation" continued all week, until the entire peninsula was claimed.

By the middle of the week, however, the Axis was not only talking about Kharkov, but devoting more time to that sector than to Kerch. The Axis was thus forced to spend more time on a negative line (that the Russians were not beating the Germans at Kharkov) than to a positive line (that the Nazis were tearing the Russians to bits at Kerch).

Main Axis lines on the Russian fighting were: the Kerch and Kharkov fighting proves that the Germans are superior in men, machines and fighting power. While the Russians lack offensive power; the Allies, including the American radio, are putting out lies on the situation in Russia; the Kharkov offensive is just a continuation of the senseless sacrifices made by the Russians during the winter; the Russians suffered "bloody" losses and failed to gain any successes at Kharkov; though "better fortified than the Maginot Line" Kerch fell to the Nazis; Kerch is just the beginning--the sword of Damocles hangs over the heads of the Allies.

Berlin radio went out on a limb as follows: "The winner of the Battle of Kharkov will win the war--and the name of the winner is Germany."

With the German blitzkrieg season in full swing, one can well imagine the thoughts and emotions of Europeans listening to Axis denials of Russian advances instead of claims of Nazi successes.

Goering's pessimistic Berlin speech was used very slightly by the Axis. The occasion for the speech was stressed rather than the content of the speech itself.

On Martinique the Axis said the American attitude was "insolent." The demand for ships at Martinique, Berlin said, is in no way compatible with the Franco-German armistice

agreement. The Axis claimed that no ships will be released and that no decision will be reached before the Vichy Government expresses its sanction to Admiral Robert.

What We Did

American radios exploited the material they had to work on this week to considerable effect. Our week's work must have given anti-Fascists in Europe much hope and courage, while it must have left pro-Axis listeners in a stew.

We spoke less and less of the fighting at Kerch as the week progressed and put more and more stress on the Russian offensive at Kharkov. We never stopped saying that the Russians were resisting at Kerch, that the fight there was not over, but we pointed out that the Kharkov offensive was a much more important operation. The loss of Kerch, if it were lost, we implied, would be minor compared to a victory at Kharkov. We then reported the gains the Russians were making against the Ukraine city, the enormous losses the Nazis were suffering there in both men and material.

Here it was spring, we said, and the initiative on the Eastern front is with the Russians, not the Nazis.

On April 30 Tokyo radio broadcast a playlet in which one of the characters was Col. Doolittle. According to this playlet, Doolittle was the man who led an American squadron in the bombing of Japanese cities. It may be that Tokyo knew

where Doolittle was before the bombing, that Japanese officials were fishing for information, that the publicity on Doolittle this week was the tip-off to them on the location of Shangri-La.

In any event, the Axis said very little indeed about Doolittle's decoration and his story of the raid. At first it was ignored. Then it was said that "worsening internal conditions" in the U.S. were responsible for the "sudden announcement" of the raid on Japan. Tokyo declared that the American radio and press were "harboring suspicions as to the whereabouts of those 75 pilots decorated with the medals." This line was obviously additional fishing.

Axis propaganda on United Nations shipping difficulties did not change this week. The propaganda on Burma was also the same as last week. Although they were old lines, they were the most effective ones that the Axis used.

The arrival of the AEF group in Ireland this week and the successful attack on the Prinz Eugen were both ignored at first. Later the Axis declared that the Prinz Eugen had not been damaged and that the attacking force had suffered heavy aircraft losses--a total of 34 planes downed.

The arrival of the AEF was not mentioned at all by the Axis on medium-wave broadcasts. On short-wave, Berlin radio said the story had started "a fresh epidemic of childish chattering" about a second front. It continued: "Europe is

ready and waiting (for an invasion) so put up or shut up and do it now."

The Axis line that a second front is impossible continues to be a stock item on Axis shows, but it is used less intensively now than it was a few weeks ago.

The arrival of the AEF in Ireland was plugged very heavily by our stations. It was tied up with talk of a second front and the Russian offensive in the Ukraine. We made no promise that a second front would be opened nor did we indicate when it would be opened if an invasion of the continent occurred.

The Doolittle story was very widely used and all the details of the raid on Japan were reported. We continued to hit the Axis with the mysterious base of the attack and one show located Shangri-La at Detroit--source of U.S. planes and equipment, which will hammer the Axis into submission. There was no assurance in the Doolittle story for the Axis.

The attack against the Prinz Eugen led many shows on the day the story broke. The RAF raids on the continent were regularly reported, the one on Mannheim receiving greater attention than the others.

We did a great deal with the stories from American correspondents released from Axis countries, who filed stories from Lisbon on conditions in Italy and Germany. These stories

were tied in with stories of unrest throughout Europe. Particular stress was put on unrest in France and Yugoslavia. Talk of a second front was also used extensively with the Lisbon dispatches.

On the Martinique situation, we pointed out that we were negotiating with Admiral Robert and not with Laval. We stressed the fact that what Laval said, did or thought was irrelevant to the negotiations, and reported that as Laval shuttled back and forth from conference to conference the negotiations with Martinique authorities were going favorably.

We also reported that the most important question involved in the conversations had been settled and that the French naval vessels at the French Island were being immobilized.

Frequently used items were: Churchill's speech at Leeds; Hull's statement that the successful end of the war was closer now than we had recently thought possible; Cripps' statement on an Allied offensive against Europe.

No. 527

May 22, 1942

6:00 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. 'Donovan'

The following is a copy of the advance British Political Warfare Italian directive for the week of May 22 to May 28:

1. Do not comment on campaign against France or Mussolini's visit to Sardinia.
2. Explain new fiscal measures when they announced as inevitable result Mussolini's mistaken policy with main burden falling on classes least able bear it and as inadequate solution which fails help finance war. Real costs war being concealed by Fascists.
3. Do not draw conclusions from withdrawal German bombers from Malta; stress Mediterranean Allied activity as successful effort divert Axis forces from Russian front.
4. Report Russian fighting objectively.
5. Stress news to show Allies able attack Western Europe to refresh Axis apprehension of possible Allied invasion.
6. P.W.E. will follow above line, but no reason

why we should not, and may be reason why we should comment on Italian claims for Nice, Corsica, following line Mussolini repeating show of independence while using customary stab in back tactic of claiming really unimportant spoils from weakened defeated French.

7. If Italians get Corsica agreed line may be:

a. Stab in back;

b. Corsica, Nice are useless will not help economically;

c. move made for prestige only is certain prejudice Italy later by alienating all decent people, solidifying French American opposition at peace table.

No. 528

May 23, 1942

6:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

The following is an analysis of German home propaganda for the period May 13 to May 20:

1. Primary propaganda themes within Germany:
 - A. Homeland must be worthy of front, cheerfully producing weapons bearing burdens. Be more polite. Magnificent German women can work harder. Farmer can deliver more. Anti-inflation drive growing.
 - B. Negative: Ban on forecasts of general offensive or of expected results this summer.
 - C. Kerch victory exploited surprisingly little. Only two commentators (Fritz Theil, May 16 and a colonel, Chief of Staff of Army Corps, May 18) allowed forecast cautiously: Theil "capture Kerch... prelude greater events". But same day Theil took precautions, referring British "commitment policy" saying "Listeners familiar Churchill's method asserting Germany has certain aims, which of course in fact she has not, so that he can construe German success into failure".
2. Bans down in handling treatment given Russians, front reports included German pilots telling how they tried

kill Russian pilot parachuting earthwards. 3. Front report May 13, killed by DNB, after circulation and broadcast, referred "Bolshevik resistance flares grimly, serious situation Kerch". Apparently Kerch offensive meant be shown as lightning advance against weak opposition.

4. Main line internal party propaganda appears based on Gauleiter Wagner speech Heidelberg meeting political leaders May 10: "Brave soldiers assured party backs them, will prevent political forces spoiling what army achieved. We must be hard with ourselves, others. We political leaders must set good example. Nation always destroyed solely through leaders weakness. We must endure restrictions daily life".

5. Propaganda ministry refrains claiming credit for lull RAF attacks, no mention German retaliation as cause therefore, gives publicity German qualitative rather than quantitative air supremacy in West. Airplane FW 190 given most publicity linked with increase publicity German scientific research.

6. Probably important significant policy change indicated when Deutschlandsender May 16 reported Roosevelt's Lend-Lease delivery statement (\$600,770,000 in April, grand total 3.8 milliard dollars March 1941 to April 1942). That this no accident seen in Das Reich May 10 article discussing "record United States budget--present United States expenditure twice that of British. Before end 1942 United States

would be spending three times daily as last war". Note: Suggested explanation is that these facts show we already making vast efforts with apparently little result; also they might remove fear American vast resources not yet thrown into war scales.

7. In addition number 6, home propaganda may be undertaking attack directly U.S. production capacity. Das Reich May 10 two page article "Land Der Bergrenzten Moglichkeiten" and additional article same issue subtitled "Das Ende Amerikanischer Lebensart". It is expected further use will be made American rationing, raw material shortages.

8. No concealment American deliveries to Russia. One method of dealing with far-flung American activities, BBZ article May 16, "U.S. squadron forced operate six thousand kilometers from home".

9. Intensive attacks on American unculture and exposures weak internal position probably caused by return 605 Germans from U.S.

10. New high point reached identification America with Jews. Great stress on Roosevelt's war guilt and all-prevailing Jewishness of America. PWE explains by fact many Germans unable understand why Hitler declared war on U.S. One object this line is to show Hitler had no choice.

11. Apparent standard directive home propaganda to show only allied successes are gained at each others expense: America takes British colonies, North Ireland; England grabs Madagascar; Russia takes Britain's middle eastern spheres.

12. Important: German home propaganda said practically nothing about Martinique; mentions France slightly, non-committal.

13. Interesting note: "Europe in Battle" radio reports 7:15 PM gave features in this order: Slovaks fighting on Russian fronts May 14; Rumanians fighting there May 15; Finns, on May 16. Italians got fourth place May 18 followed by Croats on 19.

14. Incidental intelligence: Die Woche, not warned about Madagascar, published illustrated feature showing Island's resources, value to Japanese, on April 29.

15. The word "Demokratie" allowed be used in proper sense by Professor Lacroix in speech April 21 at Rafolfzell in Wintervortrag of Volksbildungswerk. Following line recently revived by Goebbels in Das Reich, Lacroix said "ERST HITLER HAT DIE ERSTE UND EINZIGE DEMOKRATIE DER WELT GESCHAFFEN, DIE AUS DEN VOLKE SCHKECHTWG GEFORMT IST". Term still used as abuse but seems likely charms totalitarianism no longer great enough permit total scorn for whole concept Democracy.

16. Anniversary Hess's flight unmentioned.

17. Berlin Victor: B. May 1, lead story titles
"DIE NIEDERTRACHTIGSTE LUFE DIESES KRIEGES" deals with alleged
Boston broadcast quoting Rosenberg "Poorest part population
most hit air raids, is no particular value to State". This
exposed, discredited, as "Dirty trick and favorite artifice"
of American propaganda. Note--this famous quotation, says
PWE, comes in article by Major Suchsland in review probably
sponsored by Rosenberg in 1936.

S 41

May 25, 1942

12:00 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

The following are the texts of French cabled messages of May 23 and May 24:

From Henry-Haye to Vichy:

"Les autorites navales ont fait connaitre au Senat que les operations de renflouage du Normandie vont etre entreprises, qu'elles dureront plus d'un an et qu'elles necessiteront probablement la demolition du quai 88 qui etait celui de la Compagnie Generale Transatlantique."

From Henry-Haye to Vichy:

"Depuis quarante-huit heures de nombreux articles de presse expriment la surprise causee aux experts militaires par le retard des allemands a entreprendre des operations militaires de grande envergure. On fait remarquer que le grand etat-major du Reich a reconnu que les operations contre la Russie auraient gagne l'annee derniere a etre commencees quelques semaines plus tot. On s'etonne donc ici que rien de tres important ne soit encore

survenu sur le front russe. On s'attend soit a un declanchement d'une grande offensive vers le Caucase, d'un moment a l'autre, soit a une tentative d'invasion de la Grande-Bretagne. De, toute facon, tous les experts s'accordent pour penser que les allemands vont entrer d'une heure a l'autre dans l'ere des mouvements de tres grande envergure."

From Vichy to Henry-Haye:

"URGENT. L'Argas et le Frimaire quittent Oran, ce jour, a destination de Marseille". (Il s'agit de deux petroliers, dont le deplacement d'Afrique du Nord en France, peut etre considere comme un des signes de la detente des rapports franco-americains)

From Vichy to Henry-Haye:

"L'Amiral Robert m'a fait part de son desir de voir affecter l'Angouleme, d'une facon definitive au trafic Etats-Unis-Antilles francaises.

"Comme il y a l'interet le plus evident a eviter l'immobilisation du plus grand nombre possible de nos navires dans les ports americains, je vous prie, d'accord avec l'Amirauté, d'effectuer une demarche immediate aupres du Departement d'Etat pour appuyer energiquement la demande formulee par l'Amiral Robert.

"J'attacherais du prix a savoir si le Mont Everest et

l'Indiana seront prochainement mis en route avec des chargements de la Croix-Rouge, soit a destination de Marseille, soit a destination de l'Afrique du Nord."

From Admiral Robert to Henry-Haye:

"Fort de France, le 23 mai. Recu le 24 mai.

"L'Amiral Hoover est venu ici pour une breve visite.

"Il m'a remis une note qui en sauvegardant la souverainete et les principes de la neutralite francaises, pose des questions d'ordre militaire et economique qui auront a etre immediatement examinees.

"Avez-vous recu du gouvernement americain une copie de cette note?"

From Henry-Haye to Vichy:

"J'ai effectue aupres du Departement d'Etat la demarche prescrite par Votre Excellence, au sujet des chargements de l'Ile de Re et de l'Ile de Noirmoutier.

"J'ai recu comme reponse que rien ne pouvait etre definitivement decide, avant que soient reglees les questions actuellement negociees aux Antilles.

"Il apparait tres nettement qu'il s'agit d'une simple position evasive et qu'en definitive les accords de ravitaillement concernant l'Afrique du Nord sont purement et simplement suspendus.

"Dans ces conditions, si Votre Excellence envisageait

... de l'Union de l'Europe
de la Cloix-Rouge. soit a destination
l'Union selon blocage de la

d'interrompre, en ce qui concerne la France, -et a notre tour-
l'application des dispositions dudit accord, j'attacherais du
prix a etre informe a l'avance de cette eventualite et du detail
des dispositions envisagees, j'essaierai dans ce cas d'intervenir
aupres du Departement d'Etat pour le retablissement des echanges,
retablissement qui, a mon avis, ne peut pas etre encore considere
comme tout a fait compromis."

No. 529

May 26, 1942

12:00 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

From our man in Ankara we have just received
a report as follows:

"The following message from Mihailovic is
reported by the Yugoslav Consul. 'Between the 10th
and 17th of May, three German, three Italian divisions
passed through Belgrade for Greece. An attack on
Turkey is discussed in Nazi military circles in
Belgrade.'"

No. 530

May 26, 1942

12:00 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

I thought you might be interested in the following summary, which we have furnished to Mrs. Roosevelt, which is a brief description of our special short-wave show now being sent to most of our troops around the world. This program is known as "News from Home", and is broadcast six days a week in thirty-minute transcriptions. The program was created and is produced by our radio division in cooperation with the Public Relations Section of the Army. A schedule of the program is attached.

In detail, here are the subjects covered in "News from Home":

1. A brief summary of the very latest domestic news.
2. A brief summary of the world news.

This is accomplished by "dubbing in" part of the latest Elmer Davis broadcast. We have used this technique-

- a. Because he has such excellent summaries.
- b. We announce that this broadcast is a recording of his broadcast in this country "a few hours ago."

- It authenticates the news since they thus know that they are hearing what the United States hears.

3. Baseball scores, team standings in various leagues, batting averages, etc.

4. Special Sports Commentary.

Every night we bring the voice of a well-known sports commentator. Each one covers the various fields of sport and thus brings the men up-to-date on boxing, racing, track, etc.

Of particular importance is the fact that we use sports commentators from all parts of the country. These sports announcers who are very well known in their own communities, make special recordings which are rushed to us, and then dubbed onto the programs.

5. Special Feature Event

We include some special feature event in each broadcast. It might be the re-broadcast of the Preakness, the knockout round of a prize-fight, a CIO-AFL unity meeting, a ship launching, a visit to the Stage Door Canteen.

In this spot, we attempt to bring the men some event of interest and importance on the national scene.

These also are designed to appeal to men from all parts of the country since events from all sections of the

nation are used.

6. Local Commentator

On each program, we include a brief broadcast made especially for this show by local commentators from all sections of the country. These men who are very well known in their own localities, describe the latest local happenings and include all varieties of local color. We use announcers from Indianapolis, Nashville, Chicago, Los Angeles, Oklahoma City, etc.

7. Special Column Items, and Humorous News

We cull the columns and the newspapers of the country for light items about movies, radio, theatre, etc.

We bring the latest news about names.

In this portion of the show, we also bring as many light and humorous items as possible.

8. Connie West - Girl Reporter

This is a direct news from home device. We interview, (and are now in the process of setting up machinery for interviews everywhere in the country), families of men abroad. This interview is then reported directly to the soldier of the family. The reporter tells him how his mother and father look, whether the house has been repainted, that "father wonders where you left the hoe", etc. This is broadcast directly to

the soldier -- and we ask the other men to tell him what we have broadcast, in case he does not hear it himself. We try to be sure of his listening by announcing the fact in one of our earlier spot announcements that we will have a message for him.

9. Special Production Stories

Through Col. Ginsburgh of Mr. Patterson's office, we are arranging to get outstanding production stories. These are linked directly to the men in the field. For example, we might call the attention of the Ohio men -- and report about what some of the Ohio factories are doing. Building up the fact that the men and women they know at home are working night and day to get supplies to them and our allies.

10. Special Messages from National Leaders

When certain of our national leaders make news that seems of particular interest to the men, we plan to have these leaders record special short talks written and directed to them -- telling them directly what is being done at home. Purpose - to keep the men informed and dignify them by having these messages delivered directly to them.

11. Today's Best Story

On each broadcast, we bring a special story -- amusing,

inspirational, interesting -- that is written just for this program. It is a story that is heard for the first time on "News from Home". And all of them are written by America's greatest authors - John Steinbeck, Russell Crouse, Rex Stout, etc.

The Writers War Committee has accepted this assignment and we will have the original stories of virtually every important writer.

12. The Song in the News Today

This is a recording of some best-selling hit tune sung and played by some favorite performer the men might like to hear.

In Summary

"News from Home" is something of a newspaper in radio dress.

It is carefully planned to mirror life at home as well as we possibly can with the facilities at our command.

The program is never preachy, not propagandistic, not theatrical. It is written, performed and produced with an ease of pace that makes it good for short-wave and for troop consumption.

It does attempt to bring an over-all story of American production. It is designed to go to the home communities of as many men as possible. It attempts to bring

direct messages from home. It attempts to keep the men informed, interested and entertained.

In every instance, in bringing the message from this country to our men -- wherever they are -- we try to have them realize we are doing everything possible to keep them in close touch with home. For that is our aim.

I should be glad to make available to you several samples of these transcriptions, if you would be interested in listening to them. Each transcription is one half hour.

We are attempting to arrange optimum listening time and the Army has sent memoranda to the troops throughout the world, advising them of our schedule, and asking for comments.

I am advised that short-wave equipment is being shipped by the Army with the desire of having one set for every 125 men.

At the present time, we are working with the War Department on several plans regarding transmissions of messages by the soldiers to this country.

"NEWS FROM HOME"

Daily Monday-through-Saturday news program produced
by Coordinator of Information Office in cooperation
with War Department

<u>EASTERN WAR TIME:</u>	<u>STATION:</u>	<u>Beamed on:</u>	<u>Frequency:</u>
*) 12:00 - 12:30 a.m.	WRUL Boston	Far East	11,790 KC 25.4 M
*) 12:00 - 12:30 a.m.	WRUW Boston	Far East	9,700 30.9
*) 12:00 - 12:30 a.m.	WRUS Boston	Far East	6,040 49.6
6:30 - 7:00 a.m.	WJQ New York	Australia	10,010 30.0
8:30 - 9:00 a.m.	WJQ New York	Australia	10,010 30.0
12:30 - 1:00 p.m.	WRUL Boston	Near East	15,350 19.5
12:30 - 1:00 p.m.	WRUW Boston	Near East	17,750 16.9
12:30 - 1:00 p.m.	WRUS Boston	Near East	6,040 49.6
1:45 - 2:15 p.m.	WBOS Boston	North Europe	15,210 19.72
2:30 - 3:00 p.m.	WCB New York	South Africa	15,580 19.3
3:30 - 4:00 p.m.	WCW New York	Europe	15,850 18.9

*) Omit Monday morning broadcast.

No. 531

May 26, 1942

12:00 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

The following is a circular letter relative to the war effort directed by the Greek Archbishop to all the Greek countries and churches in North and South America.

"The whole story of our nation, which has been always deeply influenced by the teachings of the Greek Orthodox Church, makes us Greeks, established in the United States, now our country and our land, feel the importance of the present war and the duty which is our own, to help our country in this war.

"We, therefore, wish to give some further instructions, not because we believe it is necessary to remind you of your duty, of which we know that you are fully aware, but in order to help you fulfill it in the best possible way. We, therefore, request that: (1) You continue without fail your prayers towards the Almighty God for our beloved President, Franklin Roosevelt, for the American Nation, the Army, the Navy and for the final victory.

"(2) Each Sunday, or important feast day, the usual sermon be followed by a special one of five to ten minutes, on the War, its aims, the ideas and ideals for which the United

States are fighting and the necessity, the duty and obligation of every person to partake in some way in the fighting. This sermon will be delivered alternately by; (a) the priest of the parish, (b) the president of the community, (c) the President of the local section of the Ahepa, Gapa, or other organization, (d) by outstanding members in each community, (e) by representatives of the local youth organizations, (f) by outstanding American personalities who will speak most willingly for such purpose. Thus, you will easily secure one speaker for each Sunday or feast day.

"(3) Every person must enlist in "Civil Defense Organization". Our theological school in Pomfret has distinguished itself as the best organized school in its area, in matters of civil defense.

"(4) All our communities and benevolent societies will purchase Defense Bonds and Stamps. You will invest in these all sums which are not needed for immediate purposes. Defense Bonds are similar to cash. I want you to be the first in this matter and would be very pleased if your communities could inform me as to the total sums of Defense Bonds purchased by the Greeks in each area. The best present which you can make to your children or to outstanding students at high schools or evening and Sunday schools in your community, would be a Defense Stamps Bank Book.

"(5) You must not cease contributing to the American Red Cross; men with their money and women by their work in the different sections of the American Red Cross. We are informed that in many communities our people gave the biggest sums of money to the American Red Cross.

"(6) When your boys are called to the Army, their departure must be made a special occasion. You will invite them to your church where they will receive Communion, after special preparation. You will present them with a small cross which they will wear on their person. You will exhort them to honor their name, the Greek Orthodox Church, their country of origin, their parents and their teachers. You will also give them a membership card of our Archbishopric. You will further congratulate their parents, who offer their children to the United States, exhorting their mothers to show themselves equals of the mothers and sisters of Greece.

"(7) You will obtain the address of all young men from your community who are at present in the armed forces. You will send them parcels containing Bibles, prayer books, Greek newspapers and magazines, Greek phonograph records, and small articles of apparel, such as socks, handkerchiefs, etc. This is a very important service which you can render to our boys. It would be advisable if each community publishes in the newspapers a list of officers and men belonging to her.

"(8) The priests of your community will keep in constant touch by letter with all officers and men in the armed forces, inquiring as to their possible needs and giving them advice regarding their religious duties.

"We are informed that many of our boys have shown excellent conduct in the Army and have been given important positions therein.

"(9) You will advise parents to write regularly to their children in the Army.

"(10) If there are any military camps in the vicinity of your parish, you will seek and find all Greek Orthodox officers and soldiers, inviting them to attend the church. You will visit them as often as permitted and inquire as to their possible needs, being always their friends and advisers. The same work will be done in the several ports and naval bases.

"(11) Young boys, and especially young girls, must try to keep a correspondence with all soldiers who happen to have no family or friends. Such a correspondence has a very great moral effect on the soldier.

"I hereby call on every one of you to put every ounce of your strength into the defense of our country, helping to establish the American ideals which are ours, having as their common source the teachings of Our Lord Jesus Christ.

"This war will require many sacrifices. We must, therefore, do what Christ has ordered: "If you want to save your lives and your belongings, you must offer everything you have, that is, the whole of yourself."

"We must understand this well and all of us must join the fight with the enthusiasm which has always marked our race in similar historical moments and which has always been the main help to victory.

"Calling again upon the protection of our Lord on this country, its Army, Navy and Air Forces, etc."

-2-
No. 532

May 26, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

The following from our London Office is a summary of the British Home Intelligence Report on South Western England for the week ending May 18.

"Expressed and complete unwillingness to make voluntary sacrifices, but readiness to face compulsory sacrifices is apparent.

"a. Expressed intention is to make as much money out of the war as permitted--and this often put into practice.

"b. Lack of interest in war incidents unless they are close; this is coupled with certainty that the Allies will win.

"c. There is unanimous admiration for the Russian people, and almost equally unanimous belief that the success of the Russian Army is due to the political system.

"d. That 'After the war things cannot be as have been' is constantly reiterated. There is definite antagonism to party politician and rich man.

"General: Public confidence, expectancy, optimism

widespread due primarily to the Churchill Speech. 'Absence of major defeats' is secondary cause along with Russian resistance and postponement of the fuel rationing plan.

"R.A.F.: The slackening of air attacks on Germany has drawn much adverse comment. Possible reasons: 'tacit understanding', 'our forces less powerful than led to expect', weather, increased effectiveness of enemy defense.

"Martinique: Firm stand of the United States praised by five regions. Four regions slightly bewildered and slightly irritated at not seizing as Madagascar was seized by the British and at parleying with Vichy.

"Communist activity continues, and heavy increase in membership referred to in two regions. Due to their support of second front, communists claim to have doubled party membership in third town in Eastern region.

"Far East: Many are convinced that if Germany is finished off soon Japan won't be hard to deal with. Public interest declined."

No. 533

May 26, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

You might be interested in reading the following report from one of our men in Stockholm, which is a summary of a pole on proportions and characteristics of Swedish people listening to Swedish news from abroad:

"A total of 31% usually listen to an English, German or Russian station.

"Finnish and American stations not included in survey as those who only listen to Swedish news from these stations so few total picture effected only very small extent. Also excluded are those who listen to foreign news in foreign languages for same reason.

"Twelve percent consist of those who listen both English and German news. Another group of five percent listen alternately to English, German and Russian senders. Gallup states the above indicates an objective view.

"Of the thirty-one percent mentioned ten percent listen only to English senders and .2% only shows Swedish comment from Russia.

"No big differences indicated between various classes as regards interest for the news under review. Workers listen to about same extent as middle and upper class but workers seem to avoid listening to Moscow.

"Investigation further shows sixty-two percent of those who listen notable news from abroad consider it misleading or have no opinion as to trustworthiness of news. It is obvious great number of people listen to the news from sheer curiosity."

No. 534

May 26, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

I attach a translation and a photostat copy taken from a letter received by a German in New York who is known to some of our people here and whose credibility and loyalty are unquestioned. The recipient believes that this is a true statement of German conditions, but of course there is always the question whether it might be planted propaganda. At any rate, I thought it should be brought to your attention.

..... Ein deutscher General habe schon im Juli letzten Jahres gesagt, dass es nichts nütze, wenn man 20.000 russische Flugzeuge zerstöre, die Russen hätten darnach doch noch 30.000. Der Krieg gegen Russland sei eine sehr einfache Rechnungsaufgabe: für jede halbe Million Reservisten, die die Deutschen aufbieten, hätten die Russen 2 Millionen. Er glaubt, dass die Engländer im Laufe des Sommers an der ganzen atlantischen Küste von Norwegen bis nach Biarritz in kleinen Abteilungen landen würden und dass dadurch eine Revolution in den besetzten Gebieten hervorgerufen werde. Die deutschen Besatzungstruppen seien durchwegs ältere Leute, die den letzten Krieg schon mitgemacht hätten und die jetzt nur eine achttägige Ausbildung genossen hätten. Diese Leute hätten gar keine Lust, sich zu schlagen und wenn es Revolution gebe, dann würden sie bestimmt dabei zuschauen. Auch die jungen Truppen, die an die Front müssten, seien natürlich lange nicht so gut ausgebildet wie früher. Der General sieht eine militärische Krise für Juli und August voraus und glaubt daher auch an ein baldiges Ende.

Ich lege dem Original dieses Briefes einen Bericht bei, der ungefähr gleichlautende Informationen enthält und die Aussagen des Chefredaktors einer grossen deutschen Nachrichtenagentur darstellt. Es ist interessant, dass nun alle Berichte, die wir vorliegen haben, also zuerst von einem hohen Beamten des Auswärtigen Amtes, dann von unsern industriellen Freunde aus Berlin und die beiliegenden Zeilen genau die gleiche Meinung zum Ausdruck bringen. Wenn man sich erinnert, dass alle diese Leute uns bei Kriegsausbruch und auch noch letztes Jahr davor warnten, die deutsche Macht nicht zu unterschätzen und im Gegenteil eigentlich alle Erfolge, die die Deutschen erzielt haben, voraussagten, so wird man diesen Aussagen, besonders da sie so übereinstimmend sind, doch einigermaßen Glauben schenken dürfen.

Die Nahrungsmittellage in Deutschland scheint sich tatsächlich rapid zu verschlechtern. Man muss immer bedenken, dass neben den offiziellen Rationen nichts zu haben ist, kein Gemüse und kein Obst und nur abgerahmte Milch. Bis jetzt haben die Deutschen sicher viel besser zu essen gehabt, wie während des letzten Krieges; aber nun tritt plötzlich eine eklatante Verschlechterung ein und zwar gerade bei Frühjahrsebeginn, der doch eigentlich eine Erleichterung bringen sollte. Das alles weist doch daraufhin, dass man nicht pessimistisch, sondern sehr optimistisch sein soll. Die hiesigen Engländer und Degaulisten sind denn auch optimistisch wie schon lange nicht mehr, während sie noch vor wenigen Wochen die Köpfe hängen liessen. Ich bin nun allerdings gar nicht für solche Stimmungsschwankungen, sondern immer gleichmässig, nämlich optimistisch.

Eine kennzeichnende Aussage liegt uebrigens noch vom Praesidenten der hiesigen deutschen Handelskammer vor, der beim Empfang nach der Generalversammlung den Schweizern, die sich ueber das Ausbleiben der deutschen Lieferungen beklagten, erklarte, man wuerde in der Schweiz wohl anders urteilen, wenn man wissen wuerde, welche Desorganisation heute in Deutschland herrschte. Deutlicher kann man es wohl nicht sagen.

Ein grosser Skandal muss sich auch bei der Bombardierung der Renaultwerke ereignet haben. Nicht nur, dass die Deutschen keinen Fliegeralarm gaben, sie verhinderten die franzoesischen Arbeiter, in die Luftschutzraeume zu gehen; dann wurde dem franzoesischen Roten Kreuz verboten, Hilfe zu leisten, dazu sei das deutsche Rote Kreuz da, und schliesslich wurden die Leute bis zum naechsten Morgen um 10 Uhr unter den Truemmern gelassen, naemlich bis die UFA-Wochenschau zur Aufnahme bereit war. Diese Berichte sind von durchaus zuverlaessiger Seite. Die Renaultwerke sind uebrigens vollkommen zerstoert, ebenso auch eine Reihe anderer Autofabriken. Apropos Rotes Kreuz haetten die Japaner erklaert, das Sogleksal ihrer eigenen Gefangenen interessiere sie gar nicht, denn ein rechter Japaner duerfe sich nicht gefangen nehmen lassen, infolgedessen wuerden sie sich auch nicht um die fremden Gefangenen kummern. Danach koennte also die Behauptung Edens ueber die Misshandlung der Europaeer durchaus wahr sein.

German attitude
6239
1940

Unser Freund, A.M., traf gestern hier bei einer dritten Person mit dem Chefredakteur einer grossen Berliner Nachrichtenagentur (gleichzeitig zugeteilt dem Auswärtigen Amt) zusammen. U.a. ist dieser Mann sehr befreundet mit dem uns sehr bekannten von Twardowski, der jetzt, wie bekannt, in AA tätig ist und früher Botschaftsrat in Moskau war. Dieser Chefredakteur war sehr pessimistisch eingestellt, machte aus seinem Pessimismus kein Hehl, war offen in seinen Reden, obwohl zurückhaltend, wegen der Anwesenheit der dritten Person (eine zweite Unterredung wird noch stattfinden).

Auf die Frage, wie soll man sich die Werbung zugunsten der SS, die jetzt in D. vor sich geht, erklären? gab er folgende Antwort: "Das ist sehr leicht erklärlich. Die SS Divisionen sind so gut wie vollständig aufgerieben worden. Sie existieren nur noch auf dem Papier. An der Zentralfront kam eine dieser Divisionen nur noch mit 70 Mann nach Hause. "Ich war selbst an der Front, fuhr der deutsche Chefredakteur weiter, und ich kann sagen, dass unsere Verluste an Menschen und Material einfach jeder Vorstellung spotten. Hinter der jetzigen Front sind die Strassen auf Kilometer und Kilometer, manchmal auf einer Tiefe von beinahe 100 Kilometer, mit beschädigtem, verlassenen und zerschossenem Material übersät. Die von uns erlittenen Verluste an Menschen und Material übertreffen bei weitem die in den russischen oder Exchange-Berichten genannten Zahlen.."

Frage: und die nächste Offensive?

Antwort: Ja, gewiss es wird wahrscheinlich noch zu einer Offensive kommen. Aber von der früheren Planmässigkeit ist nichts mehr zu spüren. Jetzt gibt es nur noch ein "planloses Dreinhauen", ein "absurdes gegenseitiges Vernichten". Man weiss, dass das alles vergebens ist, aber man kann nicht anders, Man muss einfach weiter kämpfen. Dies ist die wahre Stimmung an der Front, bei den Offizieren wie bei den Mannschaften...

Die Armeen, die im Sommer die Offensive ergreifen sollen, sind in keiner Weise mit denen, die im vorigen Juni losschlügen, zu vergleichen. Die Qualität ist nicht mehr dieselbe, der Kampfesmut und der Kampfwille sind nicht mehr mit den Eigenschaften der früheren Armeegruppen zu vergleichen. Die Moral ist auch nicht dieselbe. Das deutsche Heer, so wie es bisher existierte, hat aufgehört zu existieren. Dies ist eine Tatsache. Solche Heere, wie wir sie bis Dezember 1941 gehabt haben, werden wir nie wieder in den Kampf führen können. Die Millionen, die wir jetzt neu ausbilden, werden kämpfen, gewiss. Aber wie werden sie kämpfen? Ihre Ausbildung ist äusserst mangelhaft und steht meilenweit hinter der Ausbildung unserer bisherigen Bestände. Und einer der schwachsten Punkte wird die Luftwaffe sein"...

Frage: Wieso?

Antwort: Im September des vorigen Jahres haben wir plötzlich aufgehört, den Nachwuchs auszubilden. Die Fliegerschulen stoppten ganz mit der Arbeit. Die Fluglehrer und Instruktoren kamen von den Schulen fort. Alles was Flügel hatte, wurde an die Front geschickt. Selbst die Schulaeräte kamen an die Front, um als Erkundungsflugzeuge zu dienen. Aber auch zum Transport der Verletzten. Die Fluglehrer mussten gefallene Flieger ersetzen und in erster Linie die Transportflugzeuge steuern, die massenhaft eingesetzt werden mussten... In den nächsten Monaten und noch mehr im nächsten Jahr wird sich diese Tatsache bitter auswirken. Der Nachwuchs ist da. Es melden sich weiter junge Leute zur Flugwaffe, aber sie müssen noch ausgebildet werden...

Unsere Leute bewundern sehr die Russen, Sie beneiden ihre Ausrüstung, die öfters nicht so vollkommen in den Details ist, wie die deutsche, aber immer ebenso praktisch und wirksam. Besonders die tragbaren Rundfunkgeräte der Russen haben unsere Leute bewundert. Wir hatten dem nicht gleichwertiges entgegensetzen..."

Wie die Stimmung bei uns ist, fragen Sie? Nun, ich werde Ihnen sagen, was Twardowski mir sagte, kurz vor meiner Abreise aus Berlin.

"Sahen Sie, meinte Twardowski, was kann das schon ausmachen, ob Deutschland in den nächsten 50 Jahren von einem besiegten oder von einem siegreichen Russland beherrscht wird? Es ist einerlei."

Das ist die Stimmung, da wo es ankommt.

Frage: Und was denkt man von England? England wird bestimmt nicht auf dem Kontinent landen wollen. Wir, in der Schweiz, glauben nicht daran.."

Antwort:

England hat bei uns ausgespielt. Jeden Sieg, den es noch erringen könnte, würden wir als "ungerecht" und "unverdient" betrachten. Die Achtung vor dem "grossen und mächtigen" England ist hin, Endförmig.

Aber Sie, hier in der Schweiz, irren sich, wenn Sie glauben, dass die Engländer nicht landen werden. Sie werden landen. Wir besitzen darüber in Berlin einwandfreie Informationen. Sie werden verschiedenerorts landen und sich hier und da auch halten können...

Was die Massen bei uns danken? Genau wie das Heer. Keine Spur von Enthusiasmus für Hitler oder die Partei, für eine Idee oder sonst irgend was. Die Soldatenmassen und die Volksmassen haben jetzt begriffen, dass sie sich in einem Krieg befinden, dessen Sinn sie nicht begreifen, aber von dem sie verstehen, dass sie sich einfach nicht davon befreien können. Sie müssen weiter kämpfen. Von den grossen Worten unserer Zeitungen gegen Russland oder den Bolschewismus sind diese Massen in keiner Weise beeinflusst worden, aber sie werden weiter kämpfen, weil sie nicht sehen, wie sie sich davon frei machen könnten. Meutereien? Noch nicht vorgekommen und auch jetzt nicht zu erwarten. Die Arbeitermassen zuhause sind rot, das wissen wir. Aber eine Opposition hat sich noch nicht herauskristallisieren können. Und dann die innere wirtschaftliche Lage. Es wird von Woche zu Woche schlimmer werden. Die jetzt proklamierten Einschränkungen auf dem Lebensmittelmarkt sind nur ein kleiner Anfang,

Behalten Sie diesen Punkt im Kopf. Sie werden im Laufe dieses Jahres öfters an das denken müssen, was ich Ihnen jetzt gesagt habe. Die Lage ist hoffnungslos geworden, aber es ist kein Ausweg vorhanden und deshalb wird weitergekämpft..."



7463

6:00 P.M.

No. 535

May 26, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

The following is an analysis of Hitler's speech of April 26, 1942, which was sent to me by a group of psychoanalysts in Boston.

Analysis of Hitler's Speech of April 26, 1942

A careful analysis of the speech reveals that it is one of the most calculated that he has ever given. Every sentence has a direct bearing on the central theme and every lie and distortion is designed to serve a practical end rather than to induce a pleasant or satisfactory feeling in the listener. It is only after a careful study of the speech as a whole that its underlying purpose becomes clear. This primary purpose, from a psychoanalytic point of view, is to lay the foundations for a peace offer in the not too distant future.

To the casual reader or listener this purpose is not immediately obvious. On the contrary, the casual listener is inclined to conclude that the German morale is cracking and that Germany is in a bad way. Unquestionably, there is some dissension within Germany and some discontent with the progress of the war and particularly with the failure of the Russian campaign. There may be another reason which is even more telling, which we will consider later on.

Why does Hitler speak of this dissension so openly? This is a double-edged technique the Nazis adopted early last Fall. On the one hand, it is designed to throw dust into the eyes of the people in the democracies in order to weaken their war effort by creating the impression that the war is almost over and there is no sense in exerting themselves or sacrificing too many of their liberties or luxuries. This is the old technique of lulling their opponents into inactivity. On the other hand, it is their modern technique of whipping the Germans into making a still greater war effort. Hitler and Goebbels both initiated this technique last Fall in speeches and writings in which super-human efforts were demanded from the people on the grounds that if Germany wins it wins everything, but if it loses they can expect no mercy - the German nation would be annihilated and even Versailles would be generous in comparison with the peace which would follow this war. Therefore, whether they liked it or not, or whether they were in sympathy with the war or not, they were all in it now and they would all be judged together. This is the typical "partners in crime" code and their only hope of salvation in the future was to stick together and shoot it out to a successful conclusion. The result is that when the leaders now want greater effort, they talk about how badly things are going in order to arouse the fear of failure in the population.

It is possible that this section of the speech has still another purpose. It seems that Hitler goes out of his way to create the impression that he is not the ruthless individual of the past but a modest, honest, open, dutiful and law-abiding leader whose personal integrity is above question. His only concern is for the welfare of his people and the future of Germany. At heart he is really a peace-loving individual who has made every effort to spare his people the horrors of war, but since war was forced on him they must have complete faith in his leadership and share the sacrifices and observe their duties until he can restore peace to them. In other words, he avoids the gangster role and assumes the role of the benign leader to whom harsh measures are unpleasant but necessary in the interests of his people. It is logical to suppose that this new role is adopted now in order to make his future peace overtures more acceptable to the peoples of the United Nations.

The long historical introduction concerning the British Empire was construed by us as material for the Fifth Columnists abroad. The general theme is that England is not strong now and never was strong; that her Empire was built up by cunning rather than by might. By means of her position she was able to utilize the disrupted state of Europe, a condition which she did not create, and turn it to her own advantage. The success

of her theory of "balance of power" depends upon keeping European states fighting among themselves. England's entry into the last war was designed to maintain this condition on the Continent in order that her own position in the world could be preserved. She lacked the power to accomplish this in the last war and would have failed completely if she had not called the United States into the war at the eleventh hour to help her.

Even the last war sealed the doom of England. Instead of recognizing the inevitability of changes due to the evolutionary process, England was striving to maintain an earlier stage of development which was no longer tenable. The result was that on the one hand she wasted so much of her might in achieving victory in the last war that she has incapacitated herself for future challenges (Fuehrungskrieg in the transcription should probably read "Pyrrhuskrieg"). On the other hand, by calling to the United States for help she raised that country to a dominant position in world affairs - a position which England herself could not combat.

This historical approach, designed to prove that England is on the skids and cannot hope to maintain her present position, is not new in Nazi propaganda. Such arguments were frequently advanced in 1940 and it is interesting to note that they were dropped when their peace overtures, after the collapse of France, had failed. It is now resurrected and reenforced by additional evidence to show

that Europe is no longer divided against itself. On the contrary, it has reached an unbelievable state of unification in which Germans, Italians, Slovaks, Rumanians, Hungarians, Finns, Lithuanians, Letts and even Belgians, French, Ukrainians, etc., fight side by side in combatting an external and common danger. Against such an array of unified power, England's "balance of power" theory is ineffectual. Even if, with the help of the United States, she should happen to win she would win nothing, while if she loses she will lose everything. Her only hope of salvation, therefore, is to face the reality of the situation and work with this unified Europe rather than against it.

According to Hitler the factor which brought about this final unification of Europe was the recognition of the dangers inherent in the Jewish-Bolshevist combine which seeks to enslave the world. This section of the speech seems to be directive material for the Fifth Columnists in this country as well as in England. Capitalism and democracy are the Jews' stepping-stones to the enslavement of the people. By cultivating distrust and corruption they pave the way to anarchy and Bolshevism, etc. Roosevelt is a madman who has surrounded himself with Jewish advisers and is under their domination. We should get out of the war against Germany, which has never harmed us or intended to harm us, and clean our own house, etc. This is excellent material for a "whispering campaign" in the democracies.

It is important to note that in all of this material there is not a word against the English or the American people themselves. On the contrary, he even has a word of praise. The campaign is designed to wean the people from their leaders by fostering suspicion and distrust in their abilities and motives. Churchill is referred to as a cynical drunkard, while Roosevelt is a sick madman. They are greedy for power and fame and care not a whit for the interests of their people. They are not fit to rule great nations.

Contrast with this situation the one existing in Germany. Even as Hitler gives the speech, the German people with unanimous acclaim vote their leader unlimited power over the life and death of every German irrespective of their hard-earned rights. They are so thoroughly convinced of his sincerity, integrity and vision that they are willing to subordinate even the judiciary to his wishes and interpretations of what is best for Germany and the future of the German people. As he looks about him, Hitler sees nothing but honest and upright subordinates who will make history. They, as the leaders of the New Order, form a strange contrast to the leaders of the democracies who must find their encouragement in the most insignificant achievements. The impression is cultivated that the people of the democracies must wake up, rid themselves of their present leaders and select others

with vision and integrity who can understand the trend of events and, presumably, make peace with Hitler when the proper time comes.

The section of the speech in which he asks for this unlimited power is interesting. At first glance one gets the impression that Hitler has turned over a new leaf and now requests power before he wields it. This would be a considerable divergence from his past performances, as for example in the Blood Purge, when he wielded the power first and got authorization afterwards. On more careful reading, however, we find that he wielded such power on the Eastern Front last winter when he only believed that the German people had invested it in him. Likewise he tries to create the impression that the dissenters or slackers were few in numbers and that their failure to do their duty was solely the result of the hardships and tensions they had to endure. Then, however, we find him referring to wiping out whole groups who failed to live up to what was expected of them and we begin to wonder if the purge was not quite extensive.

His use of the term "selbsttheiligen" is significant. It is difficult to imagine anybody in Germany to whom this term was applicable who was not in the highest ranks of the military or the party and one who was not in close contact with Hitler himself. In other words, we can surmise from this remark that there are dissenters within

the ranks of his closest advisers. One can imagine that this dissension is confined solely to the Russian campaign and its results. This is certainly cause for dissension but it hardly seems enough, by itself, to account for Hitler's attitude at this time when the Spring Offensive is about to begin. It may have other sources which we will consider in a moment.

In any case, it seems necessary for Hitler to hold this extraordinary power as a whip over the heads of some of his ranking officials. In order to justify his request for this extraordinary power he tries to create the impression that this is an extraordinary war and consequently must be fought by extraordinary means. The war is one of life or death for the German nation and its outcome will determine the destiny of the world for hundreds or thousands of years. A war involving such stakes can, of necessity, be determined only be a long and protracted struggle requiring more than ordinary courage and endurance. Defeat for the Germans would mean the slaughter of millions of people as it did in Russia. Everything must be sacrificed to prevent such an outcome in comparison with which the present state of the war effort, the partial starvation and the Nazi domination of all activities is infinitely better than the consequences of giving in. From which the conclusion is to be drawn that the sacrifice of all acquired rights and submission to additional Nazi terror

and lawlessness are the sole protection of the German people against the Bolshevik menace.

One could also surmise from his speech that Hitler does not propose to make his peace overtures in the near future. First the Fifth Columnists must do their work, then increased submarine warfare against England and then, perhaps, some concentrated bombings which will inflict untold misery on the people, who should then be amenable to his proposals. Also, perhaps, a few spectacular victories against the Russians, although one has the feeling that in this speech he is leaving loopholes for himself to make peace overtures even though he fails to defeat Russia.

One very important point remains for consideration, namely, his scanty references to Japan. He talks at length about the great achievements of Italy which are meagre in reality and makes little mention of the achievements of Japan which are impressive. One would expect, at this time, that he would magnify them rather than to diminish them. We must suppose that he has ulterior motives in not doing so. What are these motives? From the few remarks he makes in this speech, it is impossible to say. We might suppose that in order to woo England he must soft-pedal Japan. If the British Empire is to remain intact as he implies, provided that it works with the New Order, it would require considerable settlement

with Japan. Perhaps he does not feel that this is the time to talk of such a settlement. Or, again, we might suppose that his feeble references to Japan are designed to indicate to the English that he is ready to sell them down the river whenever England is ready to talk peace. He therefore treats them lightly as though they were unimportant to his future plans.

There is, however, another possibility which seems even more likely, namely, that Hitler and the leading Nazis are afraid of the growing power of Japan. It looks almost as if some of the ranking Nazis were beginning to question the wisdom of the alliance with Japan and her entry into the war. While Germany struggles to acquire relatively worthless territory in Europe at terrific costs, they see Japan acquiring the colonies, rich in raw materials, which Germany has always coveted, with comparatively small losses. At the time of Hitler's speech Japan stood on the doorstep of India which has for years been the dreamland of the Germans - Japan seizes the world's riches while Germany fights for worthless territory which may prove to be a liability rather than an asset. It is possible that the German leaders are beginning to wonder who will recover these territories from Japan when the war is ended and Germany, together with the other European nations, are exhausted.

It has long been known to psychoanalysts that one of the Germans' favorite defense mechanisms in propaganda is that known as projection. By means of this mechanism they project on to others their own wishes, ambitions and fears. The clearest example is to be found in connection with the Jews. By projection Hitler is able to accuse the Jews of planning all the things which he himself wants to do. May it not be that in the present instance he is projecting his own fears, anxieties and difficulties to the English? In one place he says that England has made a tremendous error in allying itself with the United States since in the end she will find her ally stronger than herself. The same may be true of Germany in respect of Japan. In another place he says of England that if she wins she wins nothing, while if she loses she loses everything. May this not be equally true of Germany in regard to things of value? Perhaps it is he who finds himself in the position of having sold Germany down the river to Japan and his advisers and ranking officials may be rebuking him for it.

When we view the speech in its entirety from this point of view, it begins to make sense. There is a reason for laying the foundations for peace overtures in the not too distant future. Certain it is that nowhere in the speech does Hitler lay any claim to credit for bringing Japan into the war. If everything were above-board we would expect this to be a feather in his cap. Instead of

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that we find that Japan's entry into the war was the result of the stupidity of the democracies. May this not be another case of projection? That all is not well is evidenced by the cool commentaries on Hitler's speech given by the Japanese radio in the days immediately following its delivery.

Whatever the case may be, this latter point of view offers us an excellent opportunity for counter-propaganda to Germany. By reversing the whole picture and sending it back to Germany, we will be striking close to doubts already existent in the minds of many Germans. While Hitler is exhausting the energies of Germany and its allies in combatting the menace of Bolshevism, he is paving the way for the Great Yellow Peril to sweep over Europe (although the latter need only be implied). It is our opinion that such an approach will tap latent anxieties which are far stronger than any connected with the Bolsheviks and help drive an opening wedge between the German people and their leaders.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 27, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR W.J.D.

Your No. 536, May 26th, in regard to plywood, I wish you would take this up with Donald Nelson if you have any information on it.

F.D.R.

No. 536

May 26, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

In view of the discussions concerning construction of oil pipe lines, you may be interested in the suggestion made to me. It is this.

That recent developments in plywood have indicated the possibility that this material might be an acceptable medium for the transportation of fuel oil. It is contended that tests have shown that it can withstand tremendous pressure and can be chemically treated to be insect resistant.

It might be worthwhile to explore the possibility of this substitute.

No. 537

May 27, 1942

12:00 noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

Switzerland is now, as it was in the last war, the one most advantageous place for the obtaining of information concerning the European Axis powers. Analysis of the telegrams reaching the State Department from various posts in Europe in which we still have representatives shows that the information from Switzerland is far more important than from any other post. Nevertheless, the activities of our Legation must remain official and circumscribed, and the Minister and his associates may not be in a position to take the necessary steps to greatly extend the scope of their information.

The extension of this scope is a problem that has given me prolonged and consistent concern. I have felt it was indispensable to our war effort that this source of information should be tapped adequately. We have bent every effort to set up a properly functioning secret service organization in Switzerland. Unfortunately, delay has been caused by the necessity for obtaining passports, visas, official cover, and transportation. I assume that these delays have been unavoidable; nevertheless, they have hindered our efforts.

We have finally worked out with the State Department the appointment of a representative of this organization to proceed to Bern as "Financial Attache". The representative is a man of almost a life-time of experience in an analogous type of work. He will head up our service there.

SECRET
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His task will be to develop a comprehensive secret service dealing with material both from Germany and Italy, as well as from some of the occupied countries, but primarily from our enemies. We have discussed with him numerous possibilities. He has been furnished with names of persons who will be useful to him in his work.

In order that you may have a more specific picture of the type of thing, I shall cite certain matters on which he can begin immediately on his arrival.

(a) An American businessman happens to be in Zurich; a man who speaks admirable German, has the widest acquaintance in German banking and business circles. This man has been instructed by his head office to remain in Switzerland (he has a good business reason for doing so) and our representative will get in touch with him immediately to instruct him how to make and maintain contact with his German acquaintances for information purposes.

(b) A project exists, originated by an intelligent Polish woman, for building up an information service through a representative of the joint Jewish Distribution Committee. This service will function particularly in and around Geneva, in League of Nation circles, and will have the advantage of the numerous nationalities with their varied information which centers in that town.

(c) A young German is now returning to Switzerland on the "DROTTHOLM" ostensibly to join the German army. He will stay in Switzerland where his father holds extensive industrial properties. He will assemble information which will be passed to our representative. *State I shall advise you.*

(d) There is an American businessman representing an American firm now stationed in Switzerland. He has spent fifteen of the last twenty years operating from Bremen. His business contacts (all acquaintances throughout Germany) will be used to gather information.

You will appreciate, Mr. President, that these are merely examples of how this business will be operated and the list is by no means complete.

The Financial Attache, as I said, is well adapted to carry on the clandestine work; to handle the machinery of contact, transmission of messages, etc. However, we need badly a man of different type; some person of a quality who can mingle freely with intellectual and business circles in Switzerland in order to tap the constant and enormous flow of information that comes from Germany and Italy to these people. Such a man as I envisage would have no relation to the clandestine work other than making his reports through the Financial Attache, although he would, of course, consult with the Attache whenever advisable. The pretext of the presence of such a man in Switzerland under present conditions is extremely difficult to find. The pretext would have to

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be highly adequate; otherwise, a man moving around the country would be immediately suspected. We may be driven to adopting some official cover for such a representation.

As soon as we find the man we need and check him with the Department of State I shall advise you.

No. 538

May 27, 1942

12:00 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

The following memorandum was handed to me yesterday by a Polish Colonel who is very much concerned in the needs of their Intelligence Service in Poland. I think this has been brought to your attention, but in view of the seeming urgency I thought you ought to know just what was said.

1. "The Polish Headquarters are building up an intelligence network in the rears of the German Army in Russia as well in occupied Poland as in occupied Russia. Therefore, the Polish Headquarters in London have sent over during the winter months a number of specially trained men with material by Halifax Bombers provided by Great Britain. These men are working in the terrain and are sending very valuable information.

2. "Unfortunately since April 15, the air communication with Poland had to be stopped owing to the fact that the Halifax Bomber is unable to reach Poland during the shorter Spring nights. This interruption in dispatching men and material is deplorable particularly in view of the heavy losses among the Polish intelligence personnel; it also prevents the extension of the network so vital at the time of decisive battles on the Russian front.

3. "The only bomber able to reach easily even the eastern, less watched parts of Poland, is the Consolidated Bomber. (See

attached technical note). In view of this fact General Sikorski has brought the matter of the allotment of the six Consolidated Bombers to the Polish Forces for the above purpose to the attention of The President, who it is understood, has considered the matter favorably. General Marshall, after his interview with General Sikorski in London, promised his support. G-2, and other Branches concerned of the War Department, fully understanding the necessity of this allotment are endorsing the Polish request. However, the final decision has not been reached by the War Department owing to the fact that Poland lies in the sphere of British responsibility and normally receives the material through Great Britain. On the other hand it is surmised that although the Polish thesis is fully understood by the British Staff, there is a possibility that the British will not agree to assign to Poland these six Consolidated Bombers from the British allotment. I understand that the decision in the matter of the allotment lies with The President, who in view of its utmost importance and urgency would consider the possibility of making an exception to the general rule and would order the allotment of the six Consolidated Bombers to the Polish Commander-in-Chief.

"It is important to point out that the six Consolidated Bombers would not need any bombing devices owing to their basic mission and would be equipped with British radio sets which facts might facilitate their delivery to Poland."

TECHNICAL NOTE

Tank capacity	- Halifax II -----	2486 gal.
Tank capacity	- Liberator I -----	3000 gal.
Fuel consumption in difficult operational circumstances with engine Twin Wasp on Liberator I -----		45 gal. ph.
Best fuel consumption by engine Merkin XX on Halifax II----		47 gal. ph.
Best height for economical flight for Liberator I.-----		17,000 ft.
Best height for economical flight for Halifax II-----		12,000 ft.
Inducted speed for Liberator I in most economical flying conditions -----		117 m. ph.
Inducted speed for Halifax II in most economical flying conditions -----		155 m. ph.
In conclusion: <u>for Liberator I</u> - a) at 17,000 ft. consumption of 45 gallons ph. maximum: the true air speed amounts to 170 plus 30		200 m. ph.
<u>for Halifax II</u> - at 12,000 ft. and consumption of 47 gallons ph. true air speed 155 plus 21 -		176 m. ph.
Flying range of Liberator I - in difficult flying operational conditions -----		3,300 m.
Flying range for Halifax II - best flying conditions		2,300 m.
Total weight of Liberator II with fuel and crew 49,000 lbs. which leaves 7,000 lbs. for paid road. Deducting 3000 lbs. of paid road, as foreseen, leaves 4,000 lbs. which would allow 180 miles per hour or the addition of another gas tank. This would increase the flying range from 550 to 650 miles.		
Practice shows that flights last from 12-1/2 to 13 hours and the Halifax II can fly for 13 hours 10 min. only.		
Therefore: a) in case of expected icing conditions on return trip it is unadvisable to risk reaching the objective in view of possible fuel shortage.		
b) after finding the objective and fulfilling the assignment so little time is left, that unfavorable results are almost certain.		

No. 539

May 27, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

The following is a further condensed report on German Home propaganda.

"1. Russia continues to hold overwhelming lead, home propaganda. Large number front reports Kerch fighting. Part played by Rumanians scarcely noticeable to ordinary German. Foreign press extensively quoted "unqualified superiority German soldier" and "terrific impression on world opinion". Ordinary German probably noticed Kerch was great defeat for Allied propaganda. Sample quotation political review May 15 "at same hour our O.K.W. reported Kerch victory American transmitters broadcast Moscow announcement Soviet armies on Kerch Peninsula repulsing German thrust, while New York said Soviets still held positions and London news service went so far to report German-Rumanian forces driven back everywhere":

"2. Far Eastern war news. Only about 1/3 as much as Russian news, 1/4 as much of commentating on radio. Balance partly redressed by headlining Far East news in German press. For first time German home propaganda gave impression:

a. Chungking may make peace;

b. Chungking's military position severely threatened. Japanese press mainly quoted. Coral Sea battle news mainly quotes Japanese Australian origin. Doubtful whether Germans noticed inconsistencies Axis propaganda but had ample opportunity notice alleged Allied inconsistencies such as "American radio states in Australia it believed Japanese naval forces emerged intact from battle Coral Sea". Extremely little available inside Germany about India.

"3. Italy treated apologetically in Frankfurter Zeitung front page Rome report May 16, "Italy's mere existence as Mediterranean power been invaluable to Germany--in spite everything Italy came through this winter safe, sound, cheerful, and determined, if need be tighten her belt more next winter."

"4. Sea war treated prominently special announcements May 14, 15, and 18. May 16 press gave prominence to sinking U.S. cruiser, destroyer in Arctic, also reported 534,800 gross tons sunk between May 1 and 17 with 248,500 reported sunk during week ending May 17, of which 200,000 sunk in U.S. coastal waters. Sinking of U.S. supply ships mainly tankers far more prominent than that of British. Front page report May 17 described U-boat sinking tankers off Philadelphia. Press and radio made much use of technique illustrated following item: "tonnage sunk yesterday alone corresponds roughly to cargo space of 10,500 trucks, that is 210 goods trains which placed one behind the other would be 84 kilometres long" (political review May 19).

"5. Air war less important both news radio talks owing to great reduction operations both sides. Main impression probably represented by main press headline to O.K.W. communique May 18" grave defeat British Air force; 52 British aircraft shot down attempting attack on German naval forces and occupied territories." German daylight attacks on Plymouth, Folkestone, Brighton, Hastings, Torquay and Deal given moderate prominence.

"6. U. S. considerably more prominent than for some time past. This due primarily to ship sinkings and to return of 605 Germans from U.S.A. Former D.N.B. representative New York Cramer wrote "with beginning U.S.--Japanese war great suffering for Germans in America started". Some German journalists locked up in same cells as Negro criminals. At one camp "large percentage of military were Jews". It in keeping with Anglo-Saxon custom extend brutal treatment women and children. In New Orleans German women put with prostitutes, child murderesses. D.N.B. article by economic expert German Embassy Washington quoted "all reasonable limits long ago passed by public debt--USA which wanted be admired as land of plenty has become overnight land of shortage". Moderate prominence given May 17 to New York Jew rally. "Jews of New York met rally Central Park yesterday. Throwing weight about were Jew Lehmann, Jew LaGuardia, biggest Jew town in world, and Negro boxer Joe Louis". Landing U.S. reinforcements Northern Ireland reported probably with some prominence May 19. "U.S. troops stationed North Ireland further reinforced..Part of Ireland stolen from Irish terrorised by Britons, now under U.S. control".

"7. Home front. Propaganda highlights included Mothers Day Sunday, May 17, celebrated at great length on radio by local party organizations; May theme of "homeland be worthy of front" with such examples as Doctor Ley speaking work managers Frankfurt May 18, similar speech similar audience Karlsruhe May 19; note--not to be quoted: The Hakenkreuz banner of Mannheim May 10 quoted "what would happen to us if front not shown perseverance like burning ring around Heimat? Now it is our turn make sacrifices. Homeland will not stand aside while grey columns march. Will not be satisfied with smaller efforts than those fighting men for us". Hitler youth still much in limelight."

No. 540

May 28, 1942

12:00 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

I think this should be called to your attention.

As sources of information and as aids in our special operation work abroad, we have come in contact with the labor movements in European countries. In the course of our work with them, the suggestion has been made that a conference of labor organizations of the United Nations should be called for the purpose of formulating and issuing a joint statement expressing the united support by labor of the war effort, and the conviction of labor the world over that its hopes, aspirations and program depend upon the defeat of the Axis powers.

No. 541

May 28, 1942

12:00 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

You know Nelson Slater. He is now a Lieutenant Commander in the Navy and has just returned from a tour of duty in Hawaii. He has written me this note which I thought might be of interest to you. I have also sent a copy to Secretaries Knox and Stimson.

"If the Hawaiian Islands are vital to the defense of our West Coast, immediate steps should be taken to defend them against another air attack. This can be accomplished by greatly strengthening our long range striking force, which up to a week ago totalled between 18 and 20 B-17s. During the past few days, another twenty planes have reached the Islands of the B-26 type.

"Since weather conditions may call for torpedo attacks, both types of planes are needed and their range must be sufficient to reach the enemy carriers at distances in excess of three hundred miles from shore. To permit the rearming and refuelling necessary to this operation, a force of two hundred and forty such planes is required."

No. 542

May 28, 1942

12:00 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

Following your memorandum to me of yesterday relative to the plywood question, I immediately communicated with the War Production Board. I found that it was a matter that had not occurred to them, and at their request, I sent to them the man who had come to us. You will undoubtedly hear from Don Nelson, but I understand that the use of plywood as material for the construction of pipelines was discussed with the WPB. It was felt that until plywood had received a field test to prove its suitability, its use on a large scale in the immediate future would represent too great a risk. I understand that arrangements have now been made to inaugurate such tests.